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Path Dependence and the External




The promise of "the New Judicial Federalism"-of the independent
interpretation by state courts of state constitutional corollaries to the
federal Bill of Rights-has gone largely unfulfilled. In terms of doctrinal
development, the project of independent state constitutionalism,
launched in earnest decades ago with the publication of United States
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan's call to arms in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review,' is today more an aspiration than a practice. State
courts often do not engage in the difficult task of trying to establish
doctrinal tests that do not flow from federal precedent. Still, this does
not mean that state courts cannot make valuable contributions to
constitutional discourse-to the ongoing discussion among judges,
advocates, commentators and citizens about constitutional meaning.
Despite the constraints on the ability of these courts to innovate
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law. My thanks to Bob Williams, for
many years of terrific and inspiring conversations about state constitutional law, and his
careful review of this article; to Elizabeth Sullivan, for putting up with me and for
reading every word of this article more than once; to my friends and colleagues, Phil
Hamilton, Victor Hansen, Johanna Kalb, Jack Landau, Justin Long, Michael Meltsner,
and Louis Schulze, for their thoughtful comments and suggestions; and to Julianne
Fitzpatrick and Jordan Baumer, for their able research assistance. I am grateful to Gary
Gildin and Jamison Colbum for inviting me to present an earlier version of this article at
Penn State University's Dickinson School of Law. This article would not have been
possible without the support of Dean John F. O'Brien and a summer research stipend
from New England Law. All errors are of course mine alone.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). Brennan's article "promoted a great awakening of
state constitutionalism as the antidote to the United States Supreme Court's increasing
tendency to defer to government actors, rather than maintain or expand Warren Court era
human rights protections." Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L.
REv. 41, 50-51 (2006).
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doctrinally, independent state constitutional interpretation in individual
rights cases remains normatively desirable. That said, we must temper
our expectations about what state courts actually may be able to
accomplish.
I am not the first commentator to suggest the promise of the New
Judicial Federalism has not been met. In an article published nearly
23twenty years ago, as well as a more recent book on the subject, James
Gardner identified issues with independent state constitutional
interpretation that persist. He argues that state courts, for example,
"often appropriate and adopt federal constitutional doctrine as the rule of
decision for state constitutional provisions not only when the state
constitutional text is identical to its federal counterpart, but even when it
differs in potentially significant ways." Gardner points to the
determination by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to interpret
the Massachusetts Constitution's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures according to the same doctrinal standards adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in respect to the Fourth
Amendment-despite differences in the language of the two
constitutional provisions.'
To the extent I have resisted the argument that independent state
constitutional interpretation of individual rights protections is
problematic in the way Gardner describes, I was persuaded to revisit my
thinking in light of an experience that put the issue in context. In late
2009, a local public defender asked whether I would be interested in
writing an amicus brief in a case, Commonwealth v. Ortiz,6 then pending
before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. She thought I might
provide a state constitutional law perspective on the issue at hand-
whether, under Part I, Article 14, the Massachusetts search and seizure
provision, proof that the police omitted material facts in a search warrant
application undermines the validity of the warrant.7 The case raised the
question of how far to extend, under Massachusetts law, the reasoning
underlying Franks v. Delaware,8 in which the United States Supreme
2. James Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761 (1992).
3. JAMES GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (University of Chicago Press 2005).
4. Id. at 6-7.
5. See id. at 7.
6. Commonwealth v. Ortiz, No. 06-969-972, 2007 WL 7079995 (Mass. Super. Ct.,
June 11, 2007) (Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants' Motions to
Suppress).
7. State constitutional search and seizure protections are frequently litigated. See
Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MIss. L.J. 417 (2007).
8. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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Court, interpreting the Fourth Amendment, held that intentional
misstatements do not undermine a warrant application, so long as the
application contains a basis for probable cause even absent the
misstatements.9
The case began in April 2006, with a shooting in Marlborough,
Massachusetts. Several weeks later, local police showed a photo array to
a witness who identified one of the men as someone he believed was
involved in the shooting. Though his photo was in the array, the witness
did not identify the defendant, Angel Ortiz. Other witnesses also failed
to identify Ortiz in the photo array. The application for a warrant to
search Ortiz's residence did not note these failed identifications. The
magistrate issued the warrant and police found a firearm and cocaine in a
room in which the defendant resided.' 0
In the trial court, the defendant argued that the evidence seized must
be suppressed because the affidavit attached to the warrant application
omitted material facts." As the trial court put it, "[t]he affiant described
the identifications of [one defendant,] but omitted the failures of the
same witnesses to identify the photograph of Ortiz and the fact that two
of the witnesses said that [another man] 'looked like' the shooter or
words to that effect."l 2 Quoting from Franks, the trial court in Ortiz
noted that the Fourth Amendment entitles a defendant to an evidentiary
hearing in these circumstances-but only if he "makes a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly or intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the
warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the
finding of probable cause."' 3 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
has indicated that a similar analysis should be applied under Article 14,
and slightly expanded the Franks rule by acknowledging the right of a
trial court, in its discretion, "to hold a hearing merely on a showing that
an affidavit contained misstatements of fact, particularly material
misstatements."' 4
The trial court concluded that the defendant was entitled to a
hearing, and that the fact that witnesses had failed to identify Ortiz in the
photo array should have been included in the affidavit.'5 As the court
observed, the failure to include that information appeared "particularly
questionable" given that one of the witnesses reported seeing the shooter
9. See Ortiz, 2007 WL 7079995, at *7.
10. See id.
11. See id
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)).
14. Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 425 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Mass. 1981).
15. Ortiz, 2007 WL 7079995, at *7.
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"while on the way to the police station to view photographic arrays." 6
Nonetheless, the court ruled against suppression: "Where the cited
omissions do not affect the existence of probable cause, no inquiry is
necessary concerning whether the omissions were intentional or
reckless."' In the trial court's view, the omitted information would not
have altered the probable cause determination.' 8
A jury convicted the defendant of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. On appeal, he argued that Article 14 requires
suppression when the police seize evidence pursuant to a warrant based
upon an application from which exculpatory information was
deliberately omitted, regardless of the effect of the omissions on the
existence of probable cause.' 9 The defendant's brief begins with a
discussion of Franks and the constitutional doctrine that case establishes,
noting that individuals may also challenge a warrant based upon material
omissions from the application, 20 as the Supreme Judicial Court
suggested in a case concerning the interpretation of Article 14 called
Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred and Ninety-Two Dollars.21
In Nine Hundred and Ninety-Two Dollars, the court expressed some
doubt as to whether the focus on the ultimate existence of probable cause
would be sufficient to deter police dissembling in warrant applications.
The court stated: "if a police affiant committed perjury on a matter that
may have influenced the magistrate's finding of probable cause, arguably
the warrant should be invalidated (and the fruits of the search excluded)
even if the nonperjurious aspects of the warrant would have justified a
finding of probable cause."2 2 Indeed, other state high courts have
concluded that, where the police obtained search warrants on the basis of
intentional misstatements, evidence seized should be deemed
inadmissible.23
Relying upon Nine Hundred and Ninety-Two Dollars and the cases
in which other state courts had similarly held, the defendant focused
16. Id.
17. Id. at 7-8 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 and Commonwealth v. Corriveau,
486 N.E.2d 29, 40 (Mass. 1985)).
18. See Ortiz, 2007 WL 7079995 at *8.
19. Brief for Defendant at 1, Commonwealth v. Ortiz, No. SJC-10466 (Mass. May
14, 2009).
20. Id. at 16.
21. Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred and Ninety-Two Dollars, 422 N.E.2d 767
(Mass. 1981).
22. Id. at 770-71.
23. See, e.g., State v. Casey, 775 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (La. 2000) (holding that material
misrepresentations intended to deceive require suppression); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d
943, 946 n.6 (Alaska 1986) (holding a search warrant issued on basis of intentional




upon the nature of the omission in his case. He argued that an intentional
omission is akin to a deliberate misstatement, as distinguished from a
negligent error.2 4 As the defendant's brief stated, there is no principled
basis for distinguishing deliberate misstatements from deliberate
omissions: "[b]y reporting less than a total story, an affiant can
manipulate the inferences a magistrate will draw. To allow a magistrate
to be misled in such a manner could denude the probable cause
requirement of all real meaning." 25 Accordingly, the defendant urged the
court to hold that, "if a defendant meets the heavy burden of establishing
that an affiant acted with an intent to deceive the magistrate-whether by
misstatement or omission-art. 14 requires suppression, without regard
to the effect of the misstatement or omission on probable cause." 2 6 And
the defendant argued that individuals should be able to establish the
affiant's intent by looking at the totality of the circumstances.27
For its part, the Commonwealth responded by focusing almost
exclusively upon Franks and the Massachusetts decisions that hewed
closely to that federal precedent. The Commonwealth argued, among
other things, that the trial court had found that the information about the
failed identifications did not represent an intent to deceive. Further, in
the Commonwealth's view, an omission cannot in any event amount to a
constitutional harm because "[a]n affiant has no obligation to include in a
search warrant affidavit every exculpatory fact." 28 The Commonwealth
maintained that, as under federal law, "[o]missions from a search warrant
affidavit only require suppression if inclusion of the omitted facts would
have changed the magistrate's determination of probable cause."2 9 In
this case, as the trial court found, the inclusion of the omitted information
would not have changed the magistrate's determination.
As I noted above, the public defender representing Ortiz had asked
me to write an amicus brief arguing that the Supreme Judicial Court
should take an expansive view of the scope of the Franks doctrine under
Article 14. She wondered whether anything about the circumstances of
the framing of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 would support
that expansive view in light of the facts of this case. In other words, the
defendant's attorney believed the key to independent state constitutional
analysis in this instance could only be some unique aspect of
Massachusetts constitutional history. Perhaps John Adams and his
24. See Brief for Defendant, supra note 19, at 26.
25. United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985).
26. Brief for Defendant, supra note 19, at 31-32.
27. See id. at 32.
28. Brief for Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 25, Commonwealth v. Ortiz, No.
SJC-10466 (Mass. 2009).
29. Id. at 36.
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fellow constitution-drafters had some event or series of events in mind
when they crafted the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which could serve as a legitimate basis for departure from
federal law.
Here, then, is the problem with the New Judicial Federalism in
practice: as reflected in her request of me, what Ortiz's attorney
implicitly believed was that a separate constitutional jurisprudence of
search and seizure protections could only be developed out of sources
separate and distinct from the federal constitution. On this
understanding, independent state constitutionalism is a function of a state
constitutional experience, including text and history, which distinguishes
it from the federal experience. This makes sense if one begins with the
premise that federal doctrine provides a presumptively correct
framework for analyzing individual rights issues. Indeed, in
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, the essential disagreement centered on the way
in which the doctrinal test first developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Franks should be applied to the facts. The case was not about the
development of a new doctrinal path. Rather, so far as the lawyers and
the lower court were concerned, Franks and its Massachusetts progeny,
like Nine Hundred Ninety-two Dollars, provided a doctrinal framework
sufficient to resolve the issue at hand. The only real question concerned
how the court should apply that doctrinal framework to the facts.
Why did the defendant's attorney in Ortiz begin with an effort to
distinguish federal doctrine, rather than argue for a doctrinal framework
that would optimally effectuate the state constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures? No doubt her thinking about the
case reflected the analysis and approach that Massachusetts state courts
have expressly preferred since the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the
Franks analysis. Accordingly, the question becomes: why has the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, along with many other state high
courts, pledged its support of independent state constitutionalism, while
at the same time failing to engage in the real, and difficult, work of
doctrinal development under state constitutional individual rights
provisions? 30
Many commentators have explored this issue. Bob Williams has
long questioned state court reliance upon federal precedent in individual
30. "Why, in other words, don't state courts treat state constitutions as the
independent sources of positive constitutional law that the new theories of state
constitutional interpretation deem them to be?" GARDNER, supra note 3, at 48. See also
Long, supra note 1, at 52 (stating that the time has come to "start explaining why [state




rights cases.3 ' Others have theorized as to why there should be such
reliance. Gardner, in his inquiry into what he calls the "failed discourse"
of state constitutionalism, contends that the reason why state courts do
not engage in state constitutional doctrinal development is because there
is nothing unique about the state experience, and that state constitutional
interpretation follows from the function of state constitutions in our
32federalist governmental structure. More recently, Justin Long has
suggested that state courts primarily engage in what he calls "intermittent
independent state constitutionalism," ruling in certain cases on state
grounds and in others deferring to national standards, an approach he
believes normatively desirable.
In the first part of this article, I outline Gardner's and Long's
theories. I address why those theories do not fully explain the failure of
state courts to engage in constitutional doctrinal development-or,
perhaps more accurately, that they do not explain why state courts seem
content to allow the U.S. Supreme Court to create the doctrine that
governs shared textual commitments to individual rights and liberties,
like the protections of free expression, privacy, due process of law and
equal treatment before the law. I turn in Parts II and III to an explanation
for inconsistent independent state constitutionalism that reflects the
circumstances of state constitutional rights litigation. I suggest that the
lack of independent constitutional analysis does not represent a failure of
interest on the part of state courts, or a failure of methodology, character,
or culture, but rather is simply the consequence of strong path
dependence-that is, of a demonstrable and perhaps inevitable reliance
upon federal constitutional doctrinal paths. My effort here is descriptive,
to explain both how state constitutionalism is often path dependent, and
why the conditions under which state courts operate promote path
dependence. In Part IV, I argue that even a constrained independent state
constitutionalism has enduring normative value in respect to
constitutional discourse about individual rights and liberties, and
31. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 170
(2009) (critiquing the "notion that interpretations of the federal Constitution can
somehow authoritatively set the meaning for similar provisions of state constitutions").
32. See GARDNER, supra note 3, at 18-20.
33. Long, supra note 1, at 51-52. Numerous other commentators have pointed out
that state courts have not in practice embraced the ethos of independent state
constitutionalism. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State
Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REv. 389 (1998) (arguing that state courts tend to be
deferential to federal constitutional law); Michael Esler, State Supreme Court
Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25 (1994) (reporting that state courts do not
rely upon independent analysis in most instances); John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled
Interpretations of State Constitutional Law-Why Don't the "Primacy" States Practice
What They Preach?, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 1019 (1993) (reporting failure of state courts to
actually practice independent state constitutionalism).
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therefore represents an effort worth the support of academics and lawyers
alike.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INCONSISTENT INDEPENDENT STATE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
James Gardner has described the essential problem with
independent state constitutional interpretation of individual rights and
liberties provisions:
Notwithstanding a considerable and still-growing literature criticizing
the way state courts interpret state constitutions, most state courts
today continue to employ the same basic approach: they routinely
begin and end their analysis by adopting the rules of decision
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court for use under the U.S.
Constitution; engage in no meaningfully independent analysis of the
state constitution; and offer little in the way of explanation for their
actions. From time to time, the bolder of the state courts may reach a
result that differs from the one the U.S. Supreme Court has reached
under the federal Constitution, but in a way that suggests the result
was dictated by the state court's disagreement with the federal
outcome. 34 For Gardner, the reason why state courts "routinely begin
and end their analysis by adopting the rules of decision developed by
the U.S. Supreme Court" is that state constitutions are not like the
U.S. Constitution: they have a different role to play in our federalist
scheme of government and, accordingly, demand a different
interpretive aqproach than we would employ in respect to the U.S.
Constitution.
Gardner correctly notes that the interpretive factors that the
proponents of independent state constitutional analysis favor are
suspect.36 Hans Linde, among the most ardent proponents of
independent state constitutional interpretation, has urged state courts,
when faced with a claim under an individual rights provision of the state
constitution, to critically examine the text, as well as history, structure,
precedent, and evidence of local character and values, in addition to the
pragmatic jurisprudential considerations all judges encounter. But this
methodological approach-the so-called primacy approach-is not
necessarily easy to follow. Textual variations in individual rights
provisions are often slight. Historical experience, as it has affected the
shape of constitutional development, is more often shared among citizens
34. GARDNER, supra note 3, at 14.
35. See id. at 18-20.
36. See id. at 48-49.
37. See Hans Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165, 181-93 (1984).
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across state lines, rather than isolated to a particular state. And state
38constitutional precedent may be nonexistent.
All of which points to a convergence between state constitutional
meaning and the understanding of federal law as set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. As Gardner concludes, it
should be unsurprising that state court judges "might prefer for pragmatic
reasons to dispense with a laborious demonstration of a predictable
doctrinal convergence and simply speed things up by adopting federal
constitutional law as the presumptive rule of decision under the state
constitution."39 There can be little doubt, moreover, that most state
judges do not engage in the interpretation of state constitutional text in
40
the way Linde prescribes-certainly not in every case.
But what of the argument that differences in the character and
values of a state polity justify-and, more importantly for our purposes
here, enable-state constitutional interpretation of a specific individual
rights provision that diverges from its federal counterpart?41 In
Gardner's view,
the resort to state character and values has come to occupy a position
of disproportionate importance in the methodology of state courts,
particularly when they seek to justify decisions construing their state
constitutions to provide broader protections than does the U.S.
Constitution for commonplace individual rights such as the freedoms
of speech and privacy and the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures.42
38. See GARDNER, supra note 3, at 49-50. See also Long, supra note 1, at 66
(observing that "[sitate constitutionalism is hard work; not only are the relevant
secondary sources frequently difficult to come by or to interpret, but there is commonly
little instructive precedent to guide the court."); Hans A. Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the States 'Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379, 392 (1980) (stating that
"to make an independent argument under the state [constitution] takes homework.").
39. GARDNER, supra note 3, at 50.
40. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing results of one-year
study by Justin Long of Oregon, Washington, New Jersey and New Hampshire state
constitutional decisions).
41. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach-and Why Study-State Constitutional
Law, 34 OKLA. CiTY U. L. REv. 165, 174-75 (2009) (arguing that state courts may use
"local conditions and traditions to affect their interpretation of a constitutional guarantee"
and "fifty constitutions" may be interpreted "differently to account for . .. differences in
culture, geography and history"); Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate
to Learn from Their Children": Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global
Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1633, 1641 (2004) (arguing that state constitution
should be viewed as "the product of the democratic aspirations of people united by a
highly localized culture and history").
42. GARDNER, supra note 3, at 55.
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Gardner calls this move a resort to an implausible "Romantic
subnationalism." 4 3  It is implausible because, as he notes, internal
diversity, as well as transportation and communication technology,
among other factors, "have made state boundaries extremely porous-
indeed, for many purposes, such boundaries have become irrelevant.""
At its core, Romantic subnationalism does not provide "a contextually
plausible account of state identity that comports with socially and
empirically sustainable descriptions of contemporary American life," and
it therefore "cannot sustain a plausible methodology of state
constitutional interpretation."45  There is no true independent state
constitutionalism based upon a state's unique character and values,
Gardner maintains, because such character and values do not really
exist.46
Justin Long has also examined the problem with independent state
constitutionalism. Canvassing some of the same territory as Gardner,47
he reaches many similar conclusions. In his view, unique state character
or values cannot provide the basis for a vibrant independent state
constitutionalism, because the differences in character or values between
one state and another, or one state and the nation-even when such
matters are discoverable-are relatively rare.4 8  Further, these rare
differences cannot provide a principled basis for constitutional
decisionmaking if taken to their logical conclusion; he asks, for instance,
"if 'the people' of West Virginia value their privacy more than most,
such that a police search of a car is unreasonable, does that imply that the
West Virginia character would also rebel at a registry of sex
offenders?'9
As for enhanced protection of individual rights as a justification for
independent state constitutionalism, Long points out that this is just not a
basis upon which conservative judges are likely to pursue an independent
state constitutional analysis.50 Neither is the argument that state courts
should engage in independent state constitutional analysis in order to
promote dialogue with federal courts about the meaning of shared
43. Id. at 56.
44. Id. at 69.
45. Id. at 79.
46. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and
the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76
TEX. L. REv. 1219, 1227 (1998) (concluding as a practical matter "that any differences
between Southerners and other Americans have no significant ramifications for the
interpretation of Southern constitutions").
47. See Long, supra note 1, at 58-68.
48. See id. at 59-62.
49. Id. at 61.
50. See id. at 62-64.
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constitutional commitments. A court is likely to worry that independent
decisionmaking based upon the state constitution may run the risk of
appearing illegitimate to the people-that is, of seeming to revolve
around the rejection of federal precedent for its own sake.5' Further,
Long contends that these efforts tend to be rather hollow at the core; he
doubts any "consensus on 'American constitutionalism' will ever be
found, no matter how well-reasoned the state courts are in their rebuke of
contemporary Federal Supreme Court decisions."5 2
Another reason why state courts have not embraced the New
Judicial Federalism, Long maintains, may be the influence of American
exceptionalism-that is, the belief that "the United States Constitution
and system of government are the best in the world, and that adherence
to alternative sources of law risks debasing our national liberty.""
Translated into the work of state courts, Long posits that, to the extent
state judges "feel that the United States legal tradition is unique and
valuable, they may privilege it over competing sources of legal
authority-even from their own states."5 4 He continues:
State judges' patriotic devotion to American national law, coupled
with the common juristic unease with structural reform, suggest that
state constitutionalism may appear as an insidious threat to the
"normal," i.e. federal, way of doing things. If the "American" (legal)
way of life is the best in the world, a state judge might wonder how
can that way be improved by application of independent state
constitutionalism?55
Thus, state court judges could view American exceptionalism as a factor
that inhibits inclinations toward independent state constitutionalism. 56
For Long, the effort to persuade state courts to engage in
independent state constitutional analysis consistently on the basis of any
of the arguments in favor of the practice is ultimately futile. He supports
this conclusion with an empirical review of a year's worth of state
constitutional decisions in four states which historically have claimed to
favor independent constitutional decision-making: Oregon, Washington,
New Jersey, and New Hampshire. His review reveals that even courts
in these states do not engage in independent state constitutional analyses
in every case; rather, they do so intermittently, "lead[ing] to
51. See id. at 65-66.
52. Id. at 67-68.
53. Long, supra note 1, at 68-69.
54. Id. at 69.
55. Id. at 71.
56. See id. at 72.
57. See id. at 72-73.
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unpredictability for litigants and cast[ing] into doubt the idea that any
state court will give its constitution unflagging interpretive attention."
For example, Long finds that, while the Oregon Supreme Court
adverted to the importance of state constitutional analysis and attempted
the same in most instances, it abandoned that effort almost entirely in at
least four cases involving criminal procedure issues. 5 9 Long speculates
that "the court simply chose to save itself some time and energy in
reaching the conclusion it had already deemed appropriate," which in
each case mirrored the analysis and result that would have obtained
60under the federal constitution. In New Jersey, meanwhile, the Supreme
Court failed to engage in independent state constitutional analysis in one-
third of the cases raising state constitutional issues,6 while in New
Hampshire the Supreme Court did not substantively differentiate its state
and federal constitutional analyses in cases involving double jeopardy
and due process challenges.62
Long's explanation for these and like results is that state courts are,
and should be, in the business of practicing intermittent state
constitutionalism.63 On this theory, state courts are engaged in making a
conscious choice whether to resolve a particular individual rights issue
under the state or federal constitution. When a state court treats an issue
as a matter of state law, "the court expresses a conviction that the matter
should be decided internally, according to the state's own methods and
traditions."" In these cases, he continues, "the court is putting the state
forward as a coherent and potent legal community-not a
constitutionally significant authoring community, but an interpretive
community."65 He sees a series of autonomous state constitutional
decisions as serving to identify areas in which the state community will
"turn[] to itself to solve certain social dilemmas." 66
To the extent state courts are choosing which issues may best be
addressed by the state community, they are making a judgment about
issues that they deem national and which, therefore, "should be decided
58. Id. at 73.
59. Id. at 75-76.
60. Id. at 77.
61. Id. at 82.
62. See id. at 85-86.
63. Id. at 87.
64. Id. at 89.
65. See id. at 89-90.
66. Id. at 91. See also id. at 95-96 (concluding that "a strongly independent state
constitutional analysis stakes out the area as a matter for the state community"); id. at 102
("Even when practices only intermittently, state constitutionalism can be effective at




by the national community."6 7 He considers the example of the Oregon
cases from 1996 that address, at least in part, the scope of the
exclusionary rule under the state parallel to the Fourth Amendment. "By
treating the issue as a matter of national law," he reasons, "the state court
implicitly adopted the view that a single, national rule should apply and
that law enforcement officials should not have to conduct themselves
according to different exclusionary rules in state and federal courts."
Much of the theorizing put forth by Gardner and Long could explain
the failure of state courts consistently to engage in independent state
constitutional interpretation. Gardner is surely correct that "Romantic
subnationalism" is more myth than reality and, accordingly, that recourse
to general notions of public culture and values cannot provide a firm
foundation for judicial decisionmaking. For Gardner, inconsistent state
constitutionalism is the logical result of a federalist system in which state
constitutions are merely the vehicles through which states may resist
federal constitutional decisionmaking. And Long, for his part, believes
that the inconsistency in state constitutional interpretation of individual
rights provisions may well reflect considered and essentially strategic
determinations by state courts about which matters should be decided as
a matter of state law and which should be decided as a matter of federal
law.
Still, as plausible as these theories may be, it's not clear that, after
decades of advocacy by attorneys and state constitutional advocates,
either Gardner's or Long's account satisfactorily explains why state
courts practice independent state constitutionalism so inconsistently.
State courts only infrequently choose to explain the mechanics of their
constitutional decisionmaking. Consequently, in many instances, we
don't know whether reliance upon the federal framework reflects, for
example, the belief that the case does not provide an appropriate
opportunity to resist the federal understanding of a particular right or
interest, or the determination that the issue at hand is one particularly
suited for national as opposed to state resolution.
Indeed, it is possible that a state court had no larger theoretical
considerations in mind when it set about to resolve a dispute about the
meaning of a state constitutional individual rights provision in a
particular case. Rather, it might have been the case that the members of
the court, though capable of undertaking an independent inquiry into the
meaning of the state constitutional text and the best way in which to
effectuate that meaning, nonetheless were essentially constrained from
doing so, constrained in such a way that they instead focused their
67. Id. at 97.
68. Id. at 98.
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attention upon a different inquiry-namely, whether and how to adopt a
federal doctrinal framework into state law.69
Let's take a step back. State constitutions are connected to the
federal constitution in various ways, not least through a generally similar
structural design, with powers allocated among governmental entities
and institutions limited by commitments to the protection of individual
rights and liberties. 70 Notwithstanding these connections, it remains that
each state constitution articulates a state's own organic scheme of
governance, including its commitments to the protection of individual
rights and liberties. In this sense, at least, the state constitution is
functionally distinct from the federal constitution. And the responsibility
for explicating the meaning of the state constitution as a scheme of
governance ultimately falls not to the federal courts, but to the state's
highest court.71 After all, as Bob Williams has noted, state constitutions
are law,72 and state high court judges owe it to the litigants before them
and the citizens they serve to say just what the law is. 7 3
Here is where the constraints on a state court's interpretive choices
become relevant. In the process of saying what the law is when a state
court considers the meaning of a constitutional provision that is textually
or structurally similar-or, more likely, identical-to a provision of the
Bill of Rights, the work of the U.S. Supreme Court looms large.74
Indeed, it looms exceedingly large. Over the past century, the U.S.
Supreme Court has contributed so much to the development of individual
rights doctrine in so many areas-free expression, due process, equal
69. Or, it might have been the case that, given turnover in the membership of the
court, interest in independent state constitutional analysis has waned. I thank Bob
Williams for reminding me of this possibility.
70. Of course, state constitutions are far from carbon copies of the federal
constitution. See, e.g., Michael E. Libonati, State Constitutions and Legislative Process:
The Road Not Taken, 89 B.U. L. REv. 863, 866 (2009) (observing that, in respect to
lawmaking procedures, "[m]ost state constitutions do not follow the federal model").
71. See Rex Armstrong, State Court Federalism, 30 VAL. U.L. REV. 493, 495 (1996)
(discussing obligation of state supreme court to interpret state constitution).
72. See WILLIAMS, supra note 3 1, at 3 (discussing state constitution as "a charter of
law and government for the state"); see also Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State
Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (noting that state
constitutions "perform the function that we expect of constitutions: they constitute");
Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 100-01 (2000) (discussing state court
authority to interpret state constitution).
73. See Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State
Constitutional Decision-making, 77 Miss. L.J. 265, 301-03 (2007) (discussing state court
obligation to provide guidance).
74. See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 33, at 290-91 (discussing state court reliance upon
federal reasoning and results); Esler, supra note 33, at 28-32 (same). Bob Williams has
described the U.S. Supreme Court's individual rights jurisprudence as exerting an
"overwhelming gravitational pull." WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 185.
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protection, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
to name a few-that the real possibility of developing a novel doctrinal
approach may appear daunting to a state court, if not entirely out of
reach. The possibility of innovation might appear still more remote if the
court lacks sufficient resources to devote to the task.
Accordingly, the failure of state courts consistently to engage in
independent state constitutional interpretation may reflect not the
limitations of state constitutions themselves, as Gardner suggests, or
even the belief that some constitutional issues are local and others
national, as Long proposes. Rather, it may be that state courts perceive
the cost of engaging in independent state constitutional analysis--of
engaging in independent doctrinal development-simply to be extremely
high. They may see the cost as so high, in fact, that they are not likely to
make the effort to figure out a different way to understand and to apply
their state constitution's protections of, say, free expression, due process,
equal protection, or the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. If the cost of actually engaging the machinery of doctrine-
development in respect to a particular individual right is higher than the
conceivable returns on that investment of time and energy, we should not
be surprised when state constitutional decisions are essentially path
dependent. Before turning to the nature of the resource constraints on
state courts that lead to path dependence, I discuss in the next Part the
theory of path dependence generally and illustrate the hold of path
dependence on state constitutional individual rights implementation.
II. PATH DEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
For all practical purposes, independent state constitutionalism did
not exist before the 1970s. As James Gardner has explained, several
factors account for the state constitutionalism's late development. First,
he points to the tradition of constitutional universalism, which "may have
predisposed state courts to approach state constitutions under the
assumption that state and federal constitutional law were essentially
identical, even interchangeable."75 The judicial protection of individual
rights and liberties, moreover, is a relatively recent phenomenon,
traceable to the efforts of the Warren court and the rights revolution of
the 1960s.76 As noted above, the situation began to change following
Brennan's Harvard Law Review article and the frustration some lawyers
75. GARDNER, supra note 3, at 37. See also Jason Mazzone, The Bill ofRights in the
Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1 (2007) (discussing application of federal
individual rights protections in early state courts).
76. See GARDNER, supra note 3, at 37.
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and judges may have felt as the Warren Court's federal rights revolution
came to an end.n
Independent state constitutionalism in the area of individual rights
and liberties came of age in the late 1970s. Bob Williams has recounted
the efforts of state courts at that time to consider their state constitutions
as sources of individual rights protections.78  The first stage of the
evolution of independent state constitutionalism was marked, as
Williams puts it, by the "thrill of discovery."79 The second stage
featured a backlash against independent state constitutional
interpretation, fueled by the perception that the movement focused on
results more than analysis. It was during this stage that state courts
began to develop criteria "to guide and limit . .. their decision about
whether to interpret their state constitutions to provide more rights than
were guaranteed at the federal level."80  The third stage, according to
Williams, has centered on what he has called "the long hard task" of
developing interpretive approaches to state constitutions.81
Despite consistent state constitutional advocacy from jurists and
commentators alike,82 the task has proved longer and harder than the
advocates of independent state constitutionalism might have imagined.
Why has the independent state constitutionalism movement not truly
83 n~ lkflourished? As discussed above, commentators like Gardner and Long
have their hypotheses, and in this Part, I explore another, arguing that the
answer may lie in path dependence. Path dependence is a function of the
external constraints acting on the ability of state courts to engage in
independent state constitutional analysis. First, I discuss the dimensions
of the doctrine of economic path dependence as it can be applied to
judicial decisionmaking. Next, I address the path dependent nature of
doctrinal development and application of state constitutional doctrine in
the area of individual rights jurisprudence. Then, in Part III, I turn to the
external constraints that have led to such strong path dependence, and
whether those constraints can be overcome.
77. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's advocacy
of state constitutionalism).
78. Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial
Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 211, 211-12 (2003).
79. Id. at 214.
80. Id. at 218.
81. Id. at 219.
82. See, e.g., State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (observing that, if the court places "too much reliance on federal precedent,
[the court] will render the State rules a mere row of shadows").
83. See supra notes 34-68 and accompanying text (discussing Gardner's and Long's




The doctrine of path dependence is premised upon the idea that
what we experience today is a product of what we have done in the
past-not just that "history matters," 84 but that "it is sometimes not
possible to uncover the logic (or illogic) of the world around us except
by understanding how it got that way."ss In general, path dependence
theory holds that, once we make the initial decision to pursue a certain
path, subsequent decisions necessarily reflect and may perpetuate that
initial decision, with the result that it may later prove difficult to change
direction.86  Eventually, we will become "locked-in" to our initial
decision. At this point, it becomes unlikely that we can change paths-
"even if [we] are locked in on a path that has a lower payoff than an
alternate one."88
Naturally, the concept of path dependence is more complex than
this description suggests. Scholars in a wide array of disciplines have
explored in great detail the different and nuanced understandings of path
dependence that might be applied to a variety of events and
circumstances. 8 9  For purposes of our inquiry into independent state
constitutionalism, the basic economics understanding of path dependence
should suffice.90 As Paul David explained in his work on the dominance
of the QWERTY keyboard configuration, path dependence refers to the
84. Stephen E. Margolis & S.J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 17, 17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
See also Raghu Garud & Peter Karnoe, Path Creation as a Process ofMindful Deviation,
in PATH DEPENDENCE AND CREATION 1, 1 (Raghu Garud & Peter Karnoe eds., 2001)
(noting that "[o]ur present and future choices are conditioned by choices we have made in
the past.").
85. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. EcON. REV. 332,
332 (1985).
86. See David Wilsford, Path Dependency, or Why History Makes It Difficult but
Not Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a Big Way, 14 J. PUB. POL'Y 251, 252
(1994).
87. Margolis & Liebowitz, supra note 84, at 17.
88. Atul Gawande, Getting There from Here: How should Obama reform health
care?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2009, at 26, 30.
89. See Paul M. Hirsch and James Gillespie, Unpacking Path Dependence:
Differential Valuations Accorded History Across Disciplines, in Garud & Peter Karnoe,
supra note 84, at 69, 74-81 (discussing application of path dependence theories to
anthropology, economics, history, management, and political science). See also Oona A.
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 606-22 (2001) (discussing the appearance in
law of increasing returns path dependence, evolutionary path dependence, and
sequencing path dependence); Kent D. Schenkel, Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts, 45
AKRON L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing path dependent aspects of law of trusts).
90. As Clayton P. Gillette put it, "[m]y argument here is more from analogy than an
effort to apply the underlying literature explicitly." Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in
Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REv. 813, 816 (1998).
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influence on eventual economic outcomes by "temporally remote events,
including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than
systematic forces." 91
Path dependence arises when a decisionmaker chooses to pursue a
particular path. "The selection of a prior path, for whatever reason,
determines current behavior." 9 2 Which path a decisionmaker selects
depends, to an extent, upon how many users are in a particular network,
as the value of participating increases with the number of people who
join that network. This in turn increases the value of the most popular
path-a popularity that of course may be unrelated to efficiency.93 In the
world of manufacturing standards, this phenomenon can lead to the lock-
in of an inefficient technology because manufacturers will be averse to
producing a new technology when a large number of individuals have
adopted the old technology.94 At the same time, the prevalence of that
old technology keeps those individuals who must choose a technology
from adopting something different. 95
The classic example of this kind of adoption and lock-in is the
QWERTY typewriter keyboard. In the 1870s, the typewriter was on the
verge of widespread commercial use, but it suffered from a serious
hardware defect: the keys would jam and repeatedly imprint the same
letter if struck too quickly.96 When E. Remington and Sons sought to
fine-tune the keyboard design to decrease the frequency of jams caused
by typebars, they settled on a new arrangement closely resembling
QWERTY. Typewriter technology continued to change throughout the
1870s, and new advances in hardware engineering displaced the use of
the typebars that caused the typewriter's jamming defect. By the 1880s,
manufacturers had begun to experiment with more efficient keyboard
layouts rivaling QWERTY, some of which increased typing speed by
twenty to forty percent. But in the 1890s, a front-stroke machine was
developed; called "the Universal," it employed a QWERTY keyboard.9 7
From that point forward, manufacturers essentially abandoned other
layouts. QWERTY's "lock-in" resulted from the advent of touch-typing
and three features of the evolving typewriter production system:
"technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and quasi-irreversibility
91. David, supra note 85, at 332.
92. Gillette, supra note 90, at 813.
93. Austan Goolsbee & Peter J. Klenow, Evidence on Learning and Network
Externalities in the Diffusion ofHome Computers, 45 J.L. & EcON. 317, 320 (2002).
94. See Gillette, supra note 90, at 817-18 (noting that "[s]tandards solve
coordination problems, allowing parties within an industry or users of a technology to
interact in ways that would not be possible if actors used variants of the standard").
95. Goolsbee & Klenow, supra note 93, at 320; Gillette, supra note 90, at 818.
96. See David, supra note 85, at 333.
97. See id at 334.
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of investment." 98  The technical interrelatedness derived from the
connection between keyboard "hardware"-that is, the physical
keyboard layout-and "software," as "represented by the touch typist's
memory of a particular arrangement of the keys."99 At the turn of the
century, when the Universal became popular, employers did not offer to
train their typists but expected them to be externally trained.
Accordingly, as more businesses purchased QWERTY machines, typists
elected to learn QWERTY to increase their marketability. The increase
in QWERTY adoptions in industry led to an overall decrease in costs to
typists (and other typewriter users who knew how to touch-type), until it
no longer made any sense for a business to invest in a non-QWERTY
typewriter system.'00
These economies of scale doomed non-QWERTY typewriter
configurations. As more businesses chose the Universal machine, touch
typists without personal preference would choose to learn the QWERTY
typing method, even though they had the option to choose other
methods. 01 While touch typists had the independent option to choose
their training, they continued to choose the QWERTY method, simply
because they saw that method become increasingly profitable as more
people elected to learn it.10 2 Eventually, by the mid-1890s, QWERTY
became locked-in due to "the high costs of software 'conversion' and the
resulting quasi-irreversibility of investments in specific touch-typing
skills."' By this point in time, hardware conversion became easier and
software conversion more difficult. Typewriter hardware was free from
the QWERTY keyboard arrangement following the resolution of the
jamming defect, but as non-QWERTY manufacturers saw the numbers
of QWERTY-programmed typists increase, they moved to convert their
hardware to QWERTY to take advantage of the growing supply of
available typists.104
Though challengers periodically have appeared,'0o and
notwithstanding our migration from typewriters to word processors to
personal computers to hand-held tablet computers, the QWERTY
arrangement remains dominant today. Indeed, it would be prohibitively
costly at this point for any business to employ a non-QWERTY
98. Id.
99. Id
100. Id. at 335.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 335.
103. Id. at 336.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 332 (discussing keyboard arrangement patented by Dvorak and Dealey,
the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (DSK)).
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system. o0 This is true despite the fact that there are more efficient
keyboard layouts than QWERTY, which would likely yield greater
returns-at a minimum, a measurable increase in typing speed, which
would in turn increase efficiency.' 07
Typewriter manufacturing is one thing, the law another. In her
groundbreaking work, "Path Dependence in the Law," Oona Hathaway
applied various models of path dependence to legal decisionmaking,
arguing that the choice to follow "precedent," though an essentially
flexible concept within the confines of a particular case, nonetheless
represents an initial piece of decision-making that sets at least a rough
path for future decisions. 0 8 When a court adheres to a precedent, it is
perpetuating the path chosen by the court that decided that earlier case-
the case that set the direction for the course of future decisions. 109 In this
way, the common law system works by "gradual[ly] building ... legal
rules upon one another over time."110 Following a rule perpetuates
further adherence to the rule."' And lawyers' arguments reinforce a path
of legal decision-making, as they rarely stray far from established
precedent.1 2 Rather, litigants prefer to center their positions on pre-
existing legal rules and standards, however ultimately inefficient they
may be." 3
Hathaway cites the example of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.11 4 A single footnote from that opinion "set the stage for the Warren
Court's assumption of an active role in monitoring the political
institutions of the country," by suggesting that the Court "would apply
different degrees of judicial scrutiny to different types of legislation."' '5
For instance, the Court in that footnote stated that it would be inclined to
apply stricter scrutiny to "legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation.""'6 As Hathaway observes, the Supreme Court
106. Id. at 336.
107. See id. at 332 (noting devotees of the DSK system "have long held most of the
world's records for speed typing").
108. Hathaway, supra note 89, at 624. Other commentators have used path
dependence models to explain various features of legal decisionmaking, including
legislative lawmaking under state constitutions. See Libonati, supra note 70, at 867
(noting that constitutional procedural constraints will "entrench[] the path-dependent
result of yesterday's controversies").
109. See Hathaway, supra note 89, at 627-28.
110. Id. at 627.
111. . See id. at 628.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 632.
114. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
115. Hathaway, supra note 89, at 630.
116. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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has devoted much time and attention in the ensuing decades "to
expanding and specifying the extent to which this suggestion would be
implemented.""' 7 From that footnote has evolved an elaborate doctrinal
framework for addressing claims raised under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the federal constitution. The federal courts are
committed to that framework, of course, and it seems that state courts
cannot readily disregard the attractiveness and persistence of that and
like doctrinal paths when addressing individual rights claims under their
state constitutions, as I show in the next section." 8
B. Path Dependence and State Constitutional Doctrine
My goal in this section is to illustrate, through a few discrete
examples, the extent to which state courts, when interpreting their own
constitutions, rely upon doctrinal paths blazed and burnished by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The QWERTY experience remains an exemplar. The
decisionmaker here is the state court, analogous to the typewriter
manufacturer facing a choice about how to configure its hardware to
ensure optimal utility going forward. The state constitutional provision
protecting an individual right or liberty, and the constitution of which it
is a part, are the hardware that the state court is committed to making
optimally useful through appropriate judicial interpretation and
enforcement. In a state constitutional case of first impression, the choice
the court has to make concerns the method by which it will implement
the constitution.
The method of implementing a constitution is what lawyers call
"doctrine." Doctrine is the lifeblood of constitutional law. In the federal
context, Charles Fried has explained, "[t]he rules and principles that
emerge" from U.S. Supreme Court decisions, lower federal court
decisions, "the practices and pronouncements" of legislatures and
executive branches, and the work of constitutional scholars, "are what is
compendiously called constitutional doctrine."'l 9 Evidenced by all these
authoritative sources, doctrine is the mediating field within which the
117. Hathaway, supra note 89, at 630.
118. The hold of such doctrinal paths may also explain state constitutional
frameworks in other areas, like separation of powers, in which it is more surprising to
find state court reliance on federal doctrine, given the different features and institutions of
state governance. Cf Lawrence Friedman, Unexamined Reliance on Federal Precedent
in State Constitutional Interpretation: The Potential Intra-State Effect, 33 RUTGERS L.J.
1031, 1031 (2002) (arguing that, in separation of powers cases, "the unexamined
adoption of federal standards into state law may lead to the establishment of analytical
frameworks that ... ultimately are ill-suited to addressing questions about institutional
arrangements under a differing constitutional structure").
119. CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW Is: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT 1 (2004).
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meaning of constitutional commands and commitments is realized. It is,
in short, the way in which courts make those commands and
commitments operationally useful.
This understanding of doctrine informs our belief as to just what it
is that we want from independent state constitutionalism. What we
would like is for state courts, when considering a state constitutional
individual rights provision, to undertake an inquiry into the meaning of
the provision and then to shape a suitable doctrine with which to
implement it.12 0  Accordingly, when we talk about the promise of
independent state constitutionalism, we are really talking about the hope
that, however the state court articulates the meaning of an individual
right or liberty, it will develop a specific doctrinal approach to effectuate
that right or liberty. The approach should appropriately respect the
constitutional values at stake and the need for courts to resolve issues
implicating those values with a certain amount of consistency. The state
court's approach does not have to be unique, of course-it may well be
that the state court will conclude the doctrine developed by the U.S.
Supreme Court provides the optimally effective framework. But it is not
unreasonable to expect that, regardless of where it ends up, the state
court's approach will reflect a real effort to interpret and apply state
constitutional commands regarding individual rights. 12 1 As Williams has
put it, "[a] state high court has the duty, in interpreting the supreme law
,,122
of the state, to adopt a reasoned interpretation of its own constitution.
State courts only rarely embrace this duty. Experience shows that a
state court is likely, more often than not, to rely upon a doctrinal
framework developed by the federal courts (though of course it may not
apply that framework in quite the same way). 123 As the cases discussed
120. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 38 (2001)
(discussing what it means for a court to implement a constitutional command).
121. See Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New
Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 137 (2000) (arguing that state courts
should endeavor "to make good constitutional law, using accepted constitutional
argument" rather than "unique constitutional law") (emphasis added).
122. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 171; see also Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and
Autonomy: The Jurisprudence ofInterpretation in State Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 635, 657 (1994) (observing that, "from the standpoint of interpretive
responsibility," state courts should provide "a compelling account" of the state
constitution, "an account that may or may not dovetail with the federal understanding").
123. I am referring here to parallel individual rights protections in state and federal
constitutions-those provisions that are textually identical or similar. See WILLIAMS,
supra note 31, at 115-16 (discussing six different kinds of state constitutional rights
provisions). The state courts have developed novel doctrinal approaches in interpreting
rights provisions that have no federal cognate, like the right to an adequate education
under the Massachusetts Constitution. See Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d
1134 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (addressing individual
right to education as requiring inquiry into sufficiency of state action rather than as
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below demonstrate, the path first established by the U.S. Supreme Court
exhibits a powerful hold on both the development and application of
constitutional doctrine by state courts resolving individual rights
challenges under state constitutions.
1. The Exclusionary Rule and the New Hampshire Constitution
Criminal cases are fertile ground for state constitutional claims.
The defense bar has been adept at pressing arguments that state
constitutional protections are more expansive than their federal
counterparts under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 12 4 One area
within criminal procedure in which many state courts have sought to
depart from the U.S. Supreme Court's approach is in the application of
the exclusionary rule. The federal exclusionary rule requires that, when
a court concludes that a search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment's doctrinal rules, any evidence obtained as a result must be
excluded from trial. The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary
rule almost a century ago, in Weeks v. United States.125  That Court
understood the exclusionary rule to be a necessary corollary to the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by agents of the
federal government, for without it that protection would be
meaningless. 126
The Supreme Court began its retreat from this understanding of the
exclusionary rule in United States v. Calandra,127 in 1974, in which it
concluded that the rule does not serve to remedy the privacy injury
suffered by the victim of an illegal search; rather, "the rule's prime
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct."l 2 8 Rather than being
a necessary corollary to the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, then, the rule, as a matter of judicial policy, should not be
extended in cases in which any additional deterrent effect would be
deprivation of fundamental interest). Of course, in this area, too, there is convergence.
See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence
in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 301, 352 (2011).
124. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141, 1148-51 (1985)
(discussing state court opportunities to address criminal issues).
125. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court later extended the
exclusionary rule's reach to include agents of state government in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court").
126. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393-94.
127. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
128. Id. at 347.
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uncertain. 129 Calandra led to United States v. Leon,o decided in 1984,
in which the Court held that, in view of the rule's deterrent purpose, it
should not apply in instances in which police executed a search in good
faith reliance upon a warrant that later proved to be defective.13 ' This is
the federal path, a path that has led the Court time and again to consider
the exclusionary rule's potential to deter government misconduct when
determining whether the rule is applicable.13 2
The New Hampshire Supreme Court is one of many state courts that
have attempted to analyze the adoption of a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule independently, as a matter of state law, and without
purporting to rely upon federal case law as dispositive.133 For several
decades, the New Hampshire high court has prided itself on its
commitment to independent state constitutional interpretation. As Long
has noted, the court has held that it will endeavor to give "independent
meaning to its state constitution first and foremost," and "customarily
add[s] boilerplate language to its constitutional decisions specifying that
it reaches the state constitution first and cites federal precedent, if at all,
merely for its persuasive power."l 34
In State v. Canelo,13 5 the court began its consideration of whether
the New Hampshire Constitution permits a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule with a review of the history of the state constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 3 6 Part I, Article
19 of the New Hampshire Constitution, like the provision of the
Massachusetts Constitution from which it was taken, is textually similar
but not precisely identical to the Fourth Amendment, though the New
Hampshire Court has not attempted to articulate a distinctive
jurisprudence on that basis. 3 7 The court concluded in Canelo that Part I,
Article 19 "manifests a preference for privacy over the level of law
enforcement efficiency which could be achieved if police were permitted
129. See id. at 351 (concluding application of the exclusionary rule would have no
deterrent effect in the context of a grand jury proceeding).
130. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
131. Seeid.at922.
132. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (declining to apply exclusionary
rule when police relied in good faith upon erroneous computer records).
133. See Matthew A. Nelson, Note, An Appeal in Good Faith: Does the Leon Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Apply in West Virginia?, 105 W. VA. L. REV.
719, 748-51 (2003) (discussing state court rejections of good faith exception under state
law through 2002).
134. Long, supra note 1, at 84.
135. State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995).
136. See id. at 1103-04.
137. See GARDNER, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing the Massachusetts and federal
search and seizure protections).
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to search without probable cause or judicial authorization."" 8 The court
saw enforcement of the rule as placing
the parties in the position they would have been in had there been ...
no violation of the defendant's constitutional right to be free of
searches [and seizures] made pursuant to warrants issued without
probable cause. In doing so, the rule also preserves the integrity of
the judiciary and the warrant issuing process.1
Importantly, the Canelo court did not actually develop a new
doctrinal approach to implementing the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Rather, the court simply declined to adopt the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as a part of New Hampshire
law. For all intents and purposes, Canelo signaled that the exclusionary
rule under New Hampshire law would function the way it had under
federal law before the Supreme Court declared deterrence to be the
exclusive aim of the rule. The only doctrinally relevant distinction the
New Hampshire court drew related to the rationale for the exclusionary
rule: where the U.S. Supreme Court saw deterrence as the rule's
animating principle, the New Hampshire Supreme Court saw a
connection to the state constitutional "preference for privacy,"l 4 0
suggesting that the rule would continue to function as a "necessary
corollary" to the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
itself. 141
The Canelo court did not outline the dimensions of the privacy-
based exclusionary rule, and the privacy rationale in itself does not
prescribe a distinct doctrinal path under the New Hampshire
Constitution-after all, the federal rule, too, is ultimately concerned with
privacy.14 2 In a case decided five years later, Lopez v. Director, New
Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles,14 3 the New Hampshire court
addressed the question of whether the exclusionary rule applies to
driver's license revocation proceedings. 1" The court concluded that the
rule should not be applied in civil cases, reasoning that the U.S. Supreme
Court has specifically limited the application of the exclusionary rule to
138. SeeCanelo,653A.2dat 1104-05.
139. Id. at 1105 (quotation and citations omitted).
140. Id. at 1004.
141. The New Hampshire Supreme Court also alluded to other rationales for the
exclusionary rule which essentially had been abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court, like
judicial integrity. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (stating
exclusionary rule's "prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct").
142. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006) (suggesting
exclusionary rule protects a person's entitlement to shield information from the
government when the police conduct a warrantless search).
143. Lopez v. N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 761 A.2d 448 (N.H. 2000).
144. See id. at 449.
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criminal trials, 14 5 under federal law, the rule will not be applied in
probation or parole proceedings, grand jury matters, or civil tax cases. 146
The New Hampshire Supreme Court also noted that other state courts,
interpreting their own constitutions, had concluded that evidence
inadmissible in a criminal trial could still be presented in license
revocation proceedings.14 7
The court's ruling in Lopez makes no sense if the court meant what
it said in Canelo, when it discounted deterrence as the principal rationale
for the exclusionary rule. If, as the court suggested in Canelo, the
primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remedy an individual's
loss of privacy by placing "the parties in the position they would have
been in" absent the illegal search, 14 8 logically the state should not be
permitted to use illegally-obtained evidence in a civil case, like a license
revocation proceeding. The loss of privacy, after all, does not depend
upon the possibility of incarceration-the government action constituting
the privacy invasion is the same no matter what penalty the individual
may face.
The fact that the Lopez court did not see Canelo as mandating
enforcement of the exclusionary rule in the civil context demonstrates the
relative strength of the federal doctrinal path. Even in light of a
relatively recent state precedent suggesting that the court had aimed to
distinguish state law from federal law in respect to the exclusionary rule
and the purpose of the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the principle animating the federal rule prevailed in Lopez.149
That this was a case decided by a court that has long claimed to value
independent state constitutionalism shows just how difficult it may be to
break free of path dependence in constitutional individual rights cases.
145. See id. at 451.
146. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 367 (1998) (concluding
that "[tihe deterrence benefit of the exclusionary rule [in probation and parole hearings]
would not outweigh the costs").
147. Lopez, 761 A.2d at 451.
148. See State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1105 (N.H. 1995).
149. The importance of uniformity with federal law, particularly in the area of
criminal procedure, has been suggested by courts and commentators as reason to employ
a lock-step analysis. See WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 194-209 (discussing lockstepping
as an interpretive methodology). But that justification is inapplicable here, in the context
of a case decided by a court that has expressly proclaimed its intention to analyze state
constitutional claims independently. See Long, supra note 1, at 84 (discussing the New
Hampshire Supreme Court and independent state constitutionalism).
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2. Equality and the Vermont Constitution
Let's turn now to a case involving the enforcement of a state
constitutional equality provision. In Baker v. State,150 the Vermont
Supreme Court addressed the question whether the refusal to issue same-
sex couples marriage licenses violated the equality guarantee of the
Vermont Constitution. That court, like the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, has expressed a commitment to independent state
constitutionalism. 15 Like many state constitutions, and unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Vermont
Constitution does not safeguard equal protection under the law. 152
Rather, the issue in Baker concerned the meaning of the state corollary to
the Equal Protection Clause-the "Common Benefits Clause," Chapter I,
Article 7-which is textually distinguishable from its federal counterpart.
The plaintiffs argued that their exclusion from eligibility for marriage
licenses violated their "right to the common benefits and protections of
the law guaranteed by Chapter I, Article 7." 153
The Baker court reviewed the text and history of the Common
Benefits Clause, concluding that "[t]he concept of equality at the core" of
the Clause "was not the eradication of racial or class distinctions, but
rather the elimination of artificial government preferments and
advantages."1 54 In view of its textual and historical analysis, the court
rejected the federal equal protection standard, with its emphasis on
scrutiny that varies with the interest implicated or the class affected, as
the appropriate doctrinal framework.155 Rather, the focus of a Common
Benefits Clause analysis would be whether a challenged law bears a
"reasonable and just relation to [a] governmental purpose."' 56 Under this
test, a court should seek to identify (1) "the part of the community
disadvantaged by the law" and (2) "the significance of the benefits and
protections" at issue, and ascertain (3) whether the law promotes the
150. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
151. See, e.g., State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 239 (Vt. 1985) (urging advocates in the
state bar to raise and brief state constitutional issues).
152. See WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 209 (noting that "[m]ost state constitutions do
not contain an 'equal protection' clause," though "they do contain a variety of equality
provisions").
153. Baker, 744 A.2d. at 869-70. The plaintiffs raised claims under the federal
constitution as well, but the court did not reach those arguments. See id. at 870 n.2.
154. Id. at 876.
155. See id. at 878 (rejecting the "rigid, multi-tiered analysis" that applies under equal
protection review). As one commentator put it, "Three distinct levels of scrutiny-
rational basis, intermediate or strict-may be the best way to assess equal-protection [sic]
claims, but it is hardly the self-ordained way." Sutton, supra note 41, at 175.
156. Baker, 744 A.2d at 878-79.
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government's ends, and (4) whether the classification "is significantly
underinclusive or overinclusive."15 7
Applying this test in Baker, the court held the marriage license
prohibition created a classification that disadvantaged only same-sex
couples. 158  The court viewed the interest at stake-the freedom to
marry-as a "vital personal right[],"l 59 and the benefits and protections
of marriage as significant.160 Though the court credited the purposes of
the law advanced by the government, including a legitimate and
longstanding interest in promoting parental commitment to children,16 1 it
nonetheless found the law fatally underinclusive, reasoning, for example,
that many opposite-sex couples marry for reasons unrelated to
procreation, and recognizing "the reality today ... that increasing
numbers of same-sex couples are employing increasingly efficient
assisted-reproductive techniques to conceive and raise children."' 6 2
Within a year of deciding Baker, the court had an opportunity to
apply its newly-minted equality analysis in a case called OMYA, Inc. v.
Town of Middlebury.'63  There, the plaintiff appealed from an
administrative decision limiting the number of trips its trucks could
complete each day through a particular village.164 The plaintiff argued,
among other things, that the regulation "violate[d] equal protection under
the Vermont Constitution[,]"l 6 5 because other truck operators were not
subject to a similar restriction.166 The court began its analysis under the
Common Benefits Clause by remarking that "[c]ourts have consistently
upheld less than comprehensive legislation out of a recognition that, for
reasons of pragmatism or administrative convenience, the legislature
may choose to address problems incrementally." 6 7 The first two cases
cited in support of this proposition are federal equal protection
157. Id. at 879.
158. See id. at 880.
159. Id. at 883 (quotation omitted).
160. See id. The benefits and protections include the right to receive a portion of the
estate of a spouse who dies intestate and protection against disinheritance, preference in
appointment as the person representative of a spouse who dies intestate, the right to bring
a wrongful death suit in respect to a spouse, and the right to bring an action for loss of
consortium. See id at 883-84.
161. See id. at 881.
162. Id. at 882.
163. OMYA, Inc. v. Town of Middlebury, 758 A.2d 777 (Vt. 2000).
164. See id. at 779.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 780.
167. Id. at 781.
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decisions.1 6 8 At no point did the court purport to apply any part of the
test it had recently announced in Baker.
This is in contrast to In re Estate of Murcury,16 9 in which the court
relied expressly upon the Common Benefits analysis articulated in Baker.
In Murcury, the petitioner challenged a statute requiring a nonmarital
child who claims an inheritance from a putative father to establish
paternity through a parentage action and motion for genetic testing
before the age of twenty-one.170 The petitioner initiated his action at the
age of thirty-eight, arguing that advances in genetic testing "rendered
obsolete any justification for a limit on the inheritance rights of
nonmarital children based upon an interest in preventing the bringing of
stale or fraudulent claims." '7  Therefore, he argued, the statutory time
limit had no "reasonable and just relation to the governmental purpose"
under the Common Benefits Clause.17 2
In applying the test set out in Baker, the court initially concluded
that the statute created a classification, and that the class of nonmarital
children had "long been the subject of invidious discrimination," and that
"intestate succession is a significant benefit."173 Still, the court remained
unconvinced that the statutory time limit did not promote reasonable and
just governmental objectives, like requiring that an action is brought
during the putative father's lifetime to ensure his availability for genetic
testing. 174  In addition, the governmental policy "facilitates better
informed estate planning (even in the absence of a will) and helps to
avoid last-minute disputes and delays in estate administration. ,75
Finally, the court concluded, the statute does not create a complete
exclusion from inheritance rights; it merely conditions the ability to seek
relief within a reasonable time period.17 6
No doubt the Vermont Supreme Court faithfully sought to apply the
Common Benefits test it had developed in Baker: it identified both a part
of the community affected by the statutory time limit-nonmarital
children-and a significant benefit-intestate succession. The court
concluded the government had a legitimate government objective in
creating this classification-ensuring the expeditious resolution of
168. See id. (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).
169. In re Estate of Alan B. Murcury, 868 A.2d 680 (Vt. 2004).
170. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 302 (2010).
171. Murcury, 868 A.2d. at 684.
172. Id (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 879 (Vt. 1999)).
173. Murcury, 868 A.2d at 684 (quoting Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 879 (Vt.
1999)).
174. Id. at 685.
175. Id. at 686.
176. See id
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paternity disputes related to inheritance rights-and a reasonable fit
between its ends and the means chosen to achieve those ends-the
statutory time limit of twenty-one years. 77 Yet the court's application of
the Baker test in Murcury suggested the Common Benefits doctrinal
framework might not be such a departure from the federal equal
protection standard after all. Indeed, little of the analysis under Baker, as
exemplified by its use in Murcury, cannot be readily traced to federal
equal protection doctrine.
Under the federal equal protection framework, the court must
identify a classification and examine the law's fit between governmental
ends and means in respect to that classification.'7 8 The first part of this
analysis involves an inquiry into whether the law implicates a suspect
class, such as race or ethnicity, or whether it discriminates on the basis of
a fundamental interest, like the right to vote.179 If the court finds that the
law discriminates on the basis of a suspect class or fundamental interest,
it must next determine whether that law is supported by a compelling
justification and whether the means chosen to achieve the government's
aims are narrowly tailored. 80 This kind of intense judicial review is of
course known as "strict scrutiny."
The mine-run of cases, however, do not implicate either a suspect
class or a fundamental interest; absent either, the court need only assess
the reasonableness of the relationship between ends and means. This
highly deferential standard is well-known as "rational basis review."'s8
Together with the few instances in which a kind of intermediate review is
warranted, as when a law implicates a quasi-suspect classification such
as sex,1 82 there are three levels of equal protection review, and which
level a court applies will depend upon the result of its initial inquiry into
the nature of the discrimination alleged under the law at issue.
In rare cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied an enhanced
rational basis test. More deferential than intermediate scrutiny, less
deferential than ordinary rational basis scrutiny, this analysis has been
177. See id. (stating that the court "discem[ed] no basis to invalidate the statute under
the Common Benefits Clause, or to disturb the judgment of the trial court").
178. See Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 37-38 (2003)
(discussing analytical steps prescribed by federal equal protection doctrine).
179. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (holding right to vote is
fundamental under federal equal protection guarantee).
180. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(explaining that highest level of equal protection review-strict scrutiny-applies to
racial classifications).
181. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (noting that laws that do not
target a suspect class or burden a fundamental interest will be upheld so long as the law's
classification "bears a rational relation to some legitimate end").




used when either the class affected has suffered discrimination on the
basis of its inherent characteristics, but cannot be deemed suspect, like
race or ethnicity, or the interest affected is more than a mere economic
interest, but less than fundamental one. A classic example of this
analysis by the U.S. Supreme Court features prominently in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.'83 In that case, the city, pursuant to
a municipal zoning ordinance, denied a special use permit for the
operation of a home for the mentally retarded. 18 4 The Court held the
government action unconstitutional, not because the mentally retarded
are a suspect class, but because the asserted justifications for the denial
appeared to rest on irrational prejudice rather than any legitimate basis
for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from other
similarly-situated facilities.'
State courts have also applied a form of enhanced rational basis
review under their state constitutions. In Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health,'86 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court-which has employed the federal equal protection framework
under the equality provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution"'
addressed the constitutionality of the Commonwealth's prohibition on
same-sex marriage. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim
involved a significant personal interest-the freedom to marry a person
of one's own choosing.'88 That interest may be distinguished from one
based upon shifting economic arrangements, like the interest in
employment, but the court did not declare it to be fundamental. 189
Nonetheless, in light of the importance of the freedom to marry a person
of one's own choosing, the court subjected the asserted justifications for
the prohibition on same-sex marriage to more searching review, holding
that the record did not support a link between the prohibition and the
Commonwealth's legitimate aims. For example, while the legislature
had a rational basis for ensuring an optimal setting for child-rearing, the
Commonwealth could not demonstrate that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples would actually further that goal.' 90
183. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
184. See id. at 435.
185. See id. at 449-50.
186. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
187. See Dickerson v. Att'y Gen., 488 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Mass. 1986) ("For the
purpose of equal protection analysis, [the] standard of review under the cognate
provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is the same as under the Fourteenth
Amendment.. .
188. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 962-63.
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Though the Baker court made an effort to connect its equality
doctrine to the text and history of the Common Benefits Clause, in its
operational form the four-part analysis appears simply to be a version of
the enhanced rational basis test employed in cases like City of Cleburne
and Goodridge. The Common Benefits Clause analysis is tiered scrutiny
without the tiers-a one-size-fits-all test that seeks to determine, like the
enhanced rational basis test, whether in the circumstances of the case the
challenged government action discriminates against an identifiable class
in an unreasonable way. Though not without its drawbacks,191 this
approach at least allows a court to police legislative classifications while
avoiding the need to rule broadly that certain classes are suspect or
interests fundamental-rulings which tend to end rather than promote
democratic debate about particular issues. 192 But we should not mistake
Baker for a decision that marks true doctrinal innovation in the area of
equality law: as the discussion in Murcury shows, the arguments under
the Common Benefits Clause test will in nearly all respects resemble
those that attorneys would make if the claims were raised under the
appropriate level of equal protection scrutiny.19 3 In this way, the path
marked by the Common Benefits Clause analysis may trace its origins to
federal precedent.
3. Conclusion
State courts may claim to strive for independence in interpreting the
individual rights provisions of their own constitutions, but, as Canelo and
Baker demonstrate, the leitmotif of "independent" constitutional analyses
often reflects principles derived from federal constitutional doctrine. In
191. See Lawrence Friedman & Charles H. Baron, Baker v. State and the Promise of
the New Judicial Federalism, 43 B.C. L. REv. 125, 143 (2001) (suggesting the Baker
approach "reasonably could be construed to involve the courts in scrutinizing all manner
of legislative enactment," while its ambiguity provides little guidance to the political
branches or lower courts).
192. See Lawrence Friedman, Public Opinion and Strict Scrutiny Equal Protection
Review: Higher Education Affirmative Action and the Future of the Equal Protection
Framework, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 267, 280-82 (2004) (discussing enhanced equal
protection review in Baker and Goodridge).
193. Compare OMYA, Inc. v. Town of Middlebury, 758 A.2d 777 (Vt. 2000)
(reviewing application of the Baker test to administrative regulations), with In re Estate
of Murcury, 868 A.2d 680 (Vt. 2004) (relying upon federal case law to guide its analysis
under the Common Benefits Clause to conclude that nonmarital children are subject to
invidious discrimination). See supra notes 163-77 and accompanying text. In his study
of state constitutional equality provisions, Jeffrey Shaman noted that "federal thinking
about equality still dominates state constitutional law." JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY
AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (2008). See also
Mazzone, supra note 75, at 6 (observing that state courts "have tended to hew to the
[Supreme] Court's understandings of analogous provisions in the Federal Constitution").
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both Canelo and Baker, the courts superficially distinguished their state
doctrinal frameworks from the correlative federal doctrinal frameworks.
But in neither case did the court articulate an approach to resolving
constitutional disputes arising under the protection against searches and
seizures or the commitment to equality that represented truly original
thinking about the optimally effective doctrinal path under the state
constitution. And, as noted above,1 94 these decisions were produced by
courts that purport to eschew the interpretive approach known as
"lockstepping," pursuant to which the court interprets state constitutional
individual rights provisions in lockstep with the federal courts. 19 5
Applying the lessons of path dependence theory, the New
Hampshire and Vermont Supreme Courts can be seen as essentially
"locked-in" to the contours of the federal doctrines that guide search and
seizure and equality determinations under the U.S. Constitution. This
lock-in is a result of the same congruence of factors that Paul David
identified as responsible for the lock-in of the QWERTY keyboard
arrangement: technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and the
irreversibility of investment.' 96
Technical interrelatedness is represented in the context of
independent state constitutional decisionmaking by the knowledge of
federal constitutional law shared by attorneys educated in United States
law schools. Though American law schools train students to engage in
legal reasoning in the abstract, to discern principles and to theorize about
doctrinal possibilities,' 97 when it comes to thinking about and making
constitutional arguments, students likely have little or no practical
experience except in relation to issues arising under the United States
Constitution. "The study of American constitutional law," Bob Williams
has observed, "has been dominated by a virtually exclusive focus on the
federal Constitution and its judicial interpretation."' 98 Indeed, relatively
194. See State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 238-39 (Vt. 1985); Long, supra note 1, at 84;
see also supra notes 134 and 151 and accompanying text (discussing the declared
commitment to independent state constitutionalism of both the New Hampshire Supreme
Court and the Vermont Supreme Court).
195. For a discussion of the varieties of lockstep state constitutionalism, see
WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 193-232 (reviewing and critiquing the various approaches to
lockstepping state and federal individual rights jurisprudence).
196. See David, supra note 85, at 334-36 (describing the features "which were
crucially important in causing QWERTY to become 'locked in' as the dominant
keyboard arrangement").
197. See Kris Franklin, "Theory Saved My Life, " 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 599, 610-11
(2005) (arguing that law schools expose students to a variety of theoretical approaches
for interpreting legal texts).
198. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS Xiii
(Matthew Bender 4th ed. 2006).
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few law schools even offer courses in state constitutional law," while
the study of federal constitutional law is generally mandatory. We saw
the effect of a federal focus in Murcury, as the Vermont Supreme Court
in that case refined its Common Benefits analysis into a four-part test
whose elements and application ultimately resembled the kind of equal
protection balancing practiced by the federal courts.
Technical interrelatedness leads to economies of scale. Faced with
an individual rights issue under a state constitution, the user costs, at
least in terms of time, for all American-trained attorneys-advocates as
well as state court judges and their law clerks-remain relatively low if
the analytical approach employed in state and federal constitutional cases
is the same or reasonably similar. Simply put, in the case of a state
constitutional individual rights claim, state court reliance upon federal
doctrinal constructs creates efficiencies and aids a court's ability to
effectively manage its workload.200 The more a state court relies upon
federal individual rights frameworks when addressing the meaning of the
correlative provisions of the state constitution, the more the cost of trying
to independently articulate or reconfigure state constitutional doctrine
will increase.
Coordination issues among a court's members could add to the
potential cost of reconfiguring state doctrine. Fredrick Schauer has
suggested, in the context of statutory construction, that the "plain
meaning" rule, despite its crudeness, at least allows justices who may
have "divergent views and potentially different understandings . .. [to]
,,201
still be able to agree about what the language they all share requires.
Accordingly, although plain meaning may be regarded as a second-best
approach to statutory construction, it provides a means by which people
with different views and experiences can reach some agreement.202 In
the context of an individual rights challenge, federal constitutional
199. See Sutton, supra note 41, at 166 (observing that "most law schools do not teach
state constitutional law, and none [to Sutton's knowledge] offers it as a core part of its
curriculum").
200. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 145 (2008) (suggesting one reason
appellate courts are motivated to follow precedent is to limit their workloads;
"[a]dherence to precedent does this both directly, by reducing the amount of fresh
analysis that the judges have to perform, and indirectly, by reducing the number of
appeals, since the more certain the law, the lower the litigation rate"); Clayton P. Gillette,
The Path Dependence of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 245, 267 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000)
(speculating that "[]udges who wish to increase their reputation with their peers may
simply want to clear their dockets quickly, so that they are not seen as imposing a heavy
caseload on their colleagues").
201. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 254 (1991).
202. See id at 255.
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doctrine similarly may offer a second-best approach to interpreting a
state constitutional mandate, but it likely eases coordination of a state
supreme court's members around a single approach, particularly when
the alternative is novel and, therefore, untested.
Over time, a state court's reliance upon federal frameworks leads to
the quasi-irreversibility of its initial investment in adapting federal
doctrine to its own ends.203 At a certain point, the court becomes locked-
in. Recall the consequences of the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
reliance upon a federal framework in Lopez, in which the court reverted
without discussion to the federal exclusionary rule analysis it had
attempted to distinguish in Canelo, a case decided just a few years
earlier.
To be clear, decisions like Canelo and Baker, and their respective
progeny, do not represent the path dependency of particular federal
judicial decisions. The New Hampshire and Vermont courts reached
conclusions in each of those cases that the U.S. Supreme Court, applying
the same essential doctrinal tests, likely would not have reached; in Leon,
for example, decided in 1984, the Supreme Court expressly reasoned that
a good faith exception would not interfere with the aim of the
exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct.204 Rather, decisions like
Canelo represent the path dependence of particular modes of analysis-
of the continued reliance by state courts upon doctrinal templates
developed by the United States Supreme Court to implement individual
rights provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
Like the QWERTY keyboard arrangement, federal individual rights
doctrines have become so familiar to how we think about constitutional
law that it is difficult to imagine that there could be a different way to
approach a given individual rights problem. As the discussion of
equality under the Vermont Constitution demonstrates, even the state
courts that purport to be doing the hard work of implementing the
equality provisions of their own constitutions, which may be textually
distinguishable from the Federal Equal Protection Clause, are not
actually proposing grand doctrinal innovations. Once one gets past the
absence of formal tiers of scrutiny, the Vermont approach to equality
enforcement in Baker looks very much like the enhanced rational basis
203. See Hathaway, supra note 89, at 631 (explaining, in respect to the common law,
that once a particular doctrinal path has taken hold, a switch to a new doctrine becomes
infeasible, despite the existence of superior alternatives).
204. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984) (allowing good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule).
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review originally developed and employed by the United States Supreme
Court.205
The simple and unremarkable point here is that the hold of path
dependence over state constitutional individual rights interpretation and
doctrinal development can be exceedingly strong. State courts in reality
are, time and again, importing into state law the essential features of the
doctrinal frameworks that the federal courts have developed, and that
they continue to apply in cases challenging government action under the
individual rights provisions of the federal constitution. In the next Part, I
address why state courts in general are unlikely to undertake independent
doctrinal inquiries when presented with opportunities to do so.
III. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING
Path dependence arises from chance events rather than systematic
forces.206 In this Part, I examine the events that have led to path
dependent state constitutional decisionmaking in individual rights cases
in an effort to understand why the doctrinal paths set out by the United
States Supreme Court seem in many instances to be inescapable. The
answer may lie in the external constraints that act in concert to limit a
state court's ability to engage in independent state constitutional inquiry.
These constraints push the court to adopt, in some form, the federal
doctrinal framework associated with a particular individual right or
liberty. If this is the case, then we need to inquire whether those
constraints could ever be overcome: would it ever be possible for
advocates to convince state courts to resist the pull of path dependence or
to revisit its prior path-dependent doctrinal determinations?
A. Whence Path Dependent State Constitutionalism?
Why would a state court be inclined, in thinking about how a state
constitutional provision should be interpreted and applied, to eschew
doctrinal development and instead adopt a version of an existing federal
framework?207 The explanation centers on the conditions under which
state courts operate, conditions which are not of their making. As in the
example of the QWERTY keyboard configuration, the path dependent
205. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Common
Benefits Clause framework).
206. See David, supra note 85, at 332.
207. The efficiency of abiding by established frameworks in later cases in the same
jurisdiction, whatever the origin of those frameworks, seems clear; this is a species of the
path dependence observed in common law decisionmaking. See Gillette, supra note 90,
at 822 (discussing the benefits of "economizing on judicial effort and ensuring that
similar cases are treated similarly").
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nature of state constitutional individual rights development is a function
of chance elements converging just so. 2 08 There is no systematic reason,
after all, why a state court that has expressly committed itself to
independent state constitutional inquiry (as opposed to one committed
instead to uniform constitutional interpretation) should ex ante adopt the
same doctrinal approach to a particular individual rights issue as the
federal courts.2 09  And yet, what David wrote in the context of
QWERTY's historical hold seems equally applicable here: while state
courts proclaim their "'free[dom] to choose,' their behavior,
nevertheless, is held fast in the grip of events long forgotten and shaped
by circumstances in which neither they nor their interests figured." 2 10
The circumstances that shape the constraints on a state court's
ability to undertake truly independent constitutional analysis of
individual rights provisions have to do with the lack of resources that
would allow the court to engage in doctrinal development in a given
case, as compared with the ready availability of doctrinal frameworks via
the reported cases of the federal courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme
Court. That is to say, inconsistent independent doctrinal development
flows from the constraining effects of resource limitations. Which
resource? For our purposes, the central resource necessary to engage in
doctrinal development may be time. The ability of a state court to focus
upon state constitutional doctrinal development in individual rights cases
can be understood in temporal terms, as a function of the size of a court's
docket of pending cases, along with the amount of intellectual capacity
among judges and law clerks that can be allocated to case disposition.2 1 1
Let's begin with docket size and intellectual capacity in the U.S.
Supreme Court. In the 2008 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts noted that, in the 2007
term, 8,241 cases were filed with the Court and 75 cases were argued;
212the Court disposed of 72 of those cases in 67 signed opinions. The
208. See David, supra note 85, at 332.
209. Again, I emphasize that I am addressing in this article the work of those state
courts that claim to embrace independent state constitutional analysis, like the New
Hampshire and Vermont Supreme Courts, and not those that, for one reason or another,
engage in lockstepping their constitutional analyses with those of the federal courts,
interpreting the federal constitution. See supra note 195 (discussing lockstepping as
interpretive methodology).
210. David, supra note 85, at 333.
211. "A judicial decision is both an intellectual and a moral act." Charles Fried,
Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1140, 1155 (1994). I suspect another
possible encroachment on the time available for case disposition in many states is the fact
of some kind of judicial election-at a minimum, the process of retaining one's judgeship
must divert some attention from the business of writing judicial decisions.
212. Appendix, in 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY at 10,
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx.
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Court also issued 67 signed opinions in the previous term.2 13 While the
nine justices had to sift through many thousands of certiorari requests to
find those 75 cases, each justice had the assistance of three or four law
clerks in doing so. During the 2007 term, no justice wrote-presumably
with the help of one or more law clerks-more than eight full opinions of
the Court.2 14 In that term, the average number of opinions of the Court
per justice was about seven. 2 15 In short, although the 2007 term of the
U.S. Supreme Court was only nine months, the structure of the justices'
workload was such that they and their clerks could devote a substantial
amount of time to thinking through the arguments presented in the half-
dozen or so constitutional individual rights cases on that term's docket.2 16
Now compare this summary of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007
docket and intellectual capacity with the comparable docket and
resources available to the New Hampshire and Vermont Supreme Courts
in 2006 and 2007. In 2006, the New Hampshire court, with five
justiceS217 and two clerks per justice, 218 had 964 incoming cases, 2 19 of
which it resolved 522, 158 by full opinion.2 20 That is more than twice the
number of cases resolved by full opinion than the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed in its 2007 term. And each justice of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court wrote more than 30 full opinions over the course of the
year-more than three times the number any one justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court wrote. Meanwhile, in 2007 the Vermont court, with the
same number of justices as in New Hampshire, and with just one law
clerk per justice, had 530 incoming cases, 221 of which it resolved 313,
with 80 by full opinion.22 2 That is more than the number of full opinions
issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2007 with four fewer justices and a
213. See id.
214. The Supreme Court-the Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REv. 516, 516 (2008) (Table I,
"Actions of Individual Justices").
215. Four justices each wrote eight full opinions for the Court in the 2008 term; the
others wrote seven each. See id. The justices, of course, did write concurring and
dissenting opinions in many cases, but no justice wrote more than 28 opinions in total;
that was Justice John Paul Stevens. See id.
216. See id at 527-29 (Table III, "Subject Matter of Dispositions with Full
Opinions").
217. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 294-95
(2009) (Table 5.1, "State Courts of Last Resort").
218. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, 123-24
(2006) (Table 20, "Provision of Law Clerks to Appellate Court Judges").
219. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN ANALYSIS
OF 2007 STATE COURT CASELOADS 152 (National Center for State Courts 2009) (Table 11,
"Reported Grand Total State Appellate Court Caseloads"). The Court Statistics Project
relied upon data from 2006 for New Hampshire. See id. at 153 n.t.
220. Id. at 179 (Table 16, "Opinions Reported by State Appellate Courts, 2007").
221. Id. at 152 (Table 11, "Reported Grand Total State Appellate Court Caseloads").
222. Id. at 179 (Table 16, "Opinions Reported by State Appellate Courts").
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fraction of the law clerk resources. And each justice of the Vermont
Supreme Court wrote about 16 full opinions, twice the number written by
the busiest U.S. Supreme Court justice.
The 2008 statistics show little variance. In that year, Chief Justice
Roberts reported that 7,738 cases were filed with the U.S. Supreme
Court, of which the Court heard arguments in 87.223 The Court issued 74
signed opinions, of which no justice wrote more than eleven.224 The
average number of opinions per justice was about eight.225 In contrast, in
2008 the Vermont Supreme Court had 503 incoming cases,226 of which it
resolved 344, with 100 by full opinion.227 Each justice wrote
approximately 20 full opinions, about double the number written by the
busiest U.S. Supreme Court justice during the 2008 term and more than
twice the average number written by the majority of the justices on the
U.S. Supreme Court.228
Of course, all cases are not the same. Some matters inevitably will
take more judicial time and attention than others, and the state court
dockets and advance sheets are filled with cases addressing matters
raising state statutory and common law claims that do not warrant more
than a few pages of explanation from the court. Still, the prospect of
independent state constitutional doctrinal development seems daunting
given the time and resources available to a court. 22 9 To illustrate more
223. Appendix, in 2009 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY at 2, available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2009year-endreport.pdf.
224. The Supreme Court-the Statistics, 123 HARV. L. REv. 382, 382 (2009) (Table I,
"Actions of Individual Justices").
225. Three justices each wrote 8 opinions, while one wrote 11, one wrote 9, and the
others 7. See id.
226. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: AN ANALYSIS
OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 97 (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, 2010) (Table 11,
"Reported Grand Total State Appellate Court Caseloads, 2008").
227. Id. at 127 (Table 16, "Opinions Reported by State Appellate Courts, 2008").
228. See id. Even courts with memberships closer to the U.S. Supreme Court have
more work than their federal counterparts. In 2008, the seven justices of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court together decided 222 appeals in 160 full opinions,
with each justice writing (with the help of two law clerks) approximately twenty-two
opinions. See Supreme Judicial Court Case Statistics for Fiscal Years 2006 Through
2010, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/sjc-case-
stats.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). In 2007-2008, the seven justices of the California
Supreme Court issued 116 written opinions, with each justice writing (with the help of at
least five law clerks), 16 opinions, or one-third more than the average of a U.S. Supreme
Court justice-while at the same time helping to dispose of 10,440 cases, almost 3,000
more than the U.S. Supreme Court. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2009 COURT
STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS: 1998-1999 THROUGH 2007-2008, at
IX (2009), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2009.pdf.
229. For an excellent overview of the docket issues facing state supreme courts, see
Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account: Toward a
State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1649-
52 (2010).
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concretely, let's consider the process by which a state court-we'll use
the New Hampshire Supreme Court23 0 -typically would go about
addressing a case raising an individual rights claim of first impression
under the state constitution. Call it the phenomenology of state
constitutional individual rights adjudication, premised on the belief that,
in trying to understand why the state courts do what they do, it is
important, as Duncan Kennedy has argued in respect to federal
adjudication, "to start with some particularization."23'
The New Hampshire Supreme Court each year must address many
hundreds of cases appealed from the state's lower trial courts. There is
no intermediate appellate court in New Hampshire. The high court's
choice of cases to schedule for full briefing and oral argument depends
upon a variety of factors, including whether the matter raises an issue in
an area in which the law is not settled. 232  This category naturally
includes issues of first impression under the state constitution. Once an
appeal is accepted and the case is docketed, an oral argument date is set.
Briefs are due in advance of the argument. 23 3
In general, the justices (and often their law clerks) will review the
briefs before oral argument. Some justices may ask their clerks to
provide summary memoranda in preparation for argument. Argument is
held, fifteen minutes per side. The justices ask their questions, and the
attorneys do their best to respond. After a morning or afternoon of
arguments-usually four cases per session-the justices retire to
conference, where the Chief Justice will take a straw poll. Many
decisions of the New Hampshire Supreme Court are unanimous-or will
end up being unanimous, after draft opinions are circulated among the
justices. Assuming unanimity in how a case should be decided, or at
least a majority view, the most senior justice in the majority will assign
the case to himself or herself or to a colleague.
After the conference, the justices return to their respective chambers
and summon their law clerks. A justice will divide the cases he or she
drew from the day's conference-at least one per day of oral argument,
but possibly as many as seven to ten after a few days of argument-
between his or her two law clerks, likely providing some sense of how a
majority of the court viewed each case and possible dispositions. From
230. I report here from experience: I clerked for Associate Justices William F.
Batchelder and John T. Broderick, Jr., of the New Hampshire Supreme Court from
September 1995 through August 1997.
231. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 518 (1986).
232. See New Hampshire Judicial Branch, Supreme Court-Judicial Duties,
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/index.htm (last visited March 6, 2011).
233. N.H. SUPREME CT. R. 16 (7) (specifying when briefs shall be filed).
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there, the law clerk takes possession of the briefs and the record of the
cases for which he or she is responsible and adds them to the pile of
cases from the last oral argument session awaiting research and draft
opinions. Weeks may pass before the clerk responsible for drafting a
decision in State v. CanelO234 plucks that case from the pile. Even if the
clerk attended the oral argument, chances are the exchanges between the
court and the attorneys are fading memories.
The law clerk begins, of course, with research. She reads the briefs,
making lists of cases to review. She gets a sense of the issues as
presented by the attorneys. She sees that the defendant in Canelo has
argued, among other things, that a good-faith exception is incompatible
with the exclusionary rule under the state constitution.23 5 In their briefs,
the attorneys on both sides rely upon federal decisions to support their
arguments, with counsel for the state doing so more than counsel for the
defendant.2 36 The defendant urges the court to consider state
constitutional decisions from other states. Some of those courts depart
from the U.S Supreme Court in how they apply the exclusionary rule
framework, emphasizing the protection of individual privacy over the
potential deterrent effect of excluding the illegally obtained evidence in
the defendant's trial.237
Our law clerk reviews several New Hampshire cases discussing the
importance of individual privacy under the state constitution. She
discovers that, while the state and federal exclusionary rule decisions
reach different results, they begin with a common conception of the
framework for analyzing violations of the protection against searches and
seizures-namely, that the exclusionary rule, whether regarded as judge-
made or constitutionally required, will prevail if, on balance, the interests
at stake warrant its application. The federal courts apply the rule if it
will promote deterrence of police misconduct, and several state courts
will also apply the rule when the circumstances warrant a remedy for a
privacy violation. Thus, our law clerk could reasonably conclude, based
upon the relevant federal and state cases, that while the courts may begin
their analyses in the same place, the state courts will in the right
circumstances privilege the importance of a remedy for the search
victim's privacy injury. Recall that the federal courts shared this view of
234. State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995). The court decided State v. Canelo
before I began my clerkship. See supra note 230.
235. In the actual case, the defendant also argued that the state constitution does not
permit the police to apply for anticipatory search warrants. See Canelo, 653 A.2d at
1100.
236. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant at 20-30, State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H.
1995) (No. 93-329) (discussing cases from outside New Hampshire in which court
rejected good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
237. See Canelo, 653 A.2d. at 1105 (citing cases from other jurisdictions).
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the exclusionary rule prior to decisions like Calandra and Leon, in which
the Supreme Court ruled deterrence the principal rationale for
1 - 238exclusion.
Because she is essentially responsible for resolving the good-faith
issue under the New Hampshire Constitution, and thereby charting the
state's future path in this area, our law clerk might consider doing some
research outside the briefs and reporters, in the legal literature. But
likely she would be inclined to do so only if she determined she had time
enough for that research; after all, other controversies-likely more than
a few-demand her attention, demand the court's attention. Further, she
has her judge's indication of the disposition in Canelo: a majority of the
court believes deterrence of police misconduct is not the "sole purpose"
of the exclusionary rule. 239  She has also found support in other
jurisdictions for the conclusion that, at least on the facts of this case,
there should be a constitutional remedy for the privacy harm suffered by
the search victim. Finally, she has found New Hampshire cases
discussing the importance of individual privacy under the state
constitution. In view of all this, why should she go further?
Our law clerk will present the draft opinion to her judge. He or she
will revise the draft and circulate it among the other chambers. The other
members of the court will review the opinion. A judge might ask one of
his or her clerks to do some additional research, but there is no
institutional incentive to recreate the effort of the chambers initially
assigned the case. After all, at the next case conference, the justices will
be considering a draft opinion that reaches a result that appears
consonant with the values underlying the New Hampshire Constitution's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, a draft that is
supported by New Hampshire precedent and decisions from other
jurisdictions. If a member of the majority in Canelo were to pause to
question whether the federal exclusionary rule framework provides a
suitable model for interpreting the New Hampshire constitution, then he
or she may take comfort in the embrace of that doctrine by other state
240
courts interpreting their own constitutions.
238. See supra notes 125-132 and accompanying text (discussing historical
development of the federal exclusionary rule).
239. See Canelo, 653 A.2d at 1105 (concluding deterrence is not the "sole purpose"
of the exclusionary rule).
240. The dissent, of course, prefers to rely upon the federal doctrinal constructs in this
area of the law, which would tie the exclusionary rule to deterrence of police misconduct.
See id at 1112 (Thayer, J., dissenting) ("The cases relied on by the majority contain no
analysis of the State Constitution, nor do they explain why departure from the present




And so our law clerk's effort ultimately was sufficient to resolve
this dispute. Though the New Hampshire Supreme Court has long
sought to give meaning to the commands of the state constitution, its
discussion about Canelo-from oral arguments to the justices' case
conference-in fact revolved around the applicability of the federal
doctrinal framework governing the enforcement of the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. There simply was too little time to
think about anything else.
B. Overcoming Path Dependence
Mark Roe, discussing modem developments in corporate law, has a
wonderfully evocative description of the hold of path dependence. He
writes:
Today's road depends on what path was taken before. Decades ago,
a fur trader cut a path through the woods, and the trader, bent on
avoiding a wolves' den and other dangerous sites, took a winding
indirect route. . . . Later travelers dragged wagons along the same
winding path the trader chose, deepening the grooves and clearing
away some trees. Travelers continued to deepen and broaden the
road even after the dangerous sites were gone. Industry came and
settled in the road's bends; housing developments went up that fit the
road and industry. Local civic promoters widened the path and paved
it into a road suitable for today's trucks. 24
1
Now, Roe proposes, the time has come to resurface the road. "Should
today's authorities straighten it out at the same time?" 2 42 The fact is, he
notes, that society, "having invested in the path itself and in the resources
alongside the path, is better off keeping the winding road on its current
path than paying to build another." 24 3 It is unlikely, given the investment
in the road as it is, that a new road will be built; only if the "path-
dependent road" becomes too costly will it be replaced.24 4
Roe might as well be describing the doctrinal dilemma in the world
of state constitutionalism. Above, I discussed the purpose of doctrine in
operational terms: doctrine is the medium through which constitutional
commands are made real and practicable.245 But respect for doctrine
serves other purposes as well. "Doctrine," Fried has argued, "not only




244. See id. at 643-44.
245. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of
constitutional doctrine).
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mediates between first principles and particular results along the timeless
dimension of inference, but it in fact-if not logical necessity-provides
continuity between a particular decision and those that have gone
before." 246 Doctrine is the link between cases and the form through
which constitutional commands and commitments persist. 2 47 And yet, as
Fried observes, "a life lived strictly according to plan is mad-and
dangerous."248 A court must recognize that a point may come when it
must start anew-that a doctrinal path, whatever its origin, has led it-
led us-"down a blind alley." 2 49
On the analogy that Roe has drawn, how would a state court know
that a federal doctrinal road, which the court is inclined to follow for
reasons of expediency, will prove too costly because the doctrine will
lead the court down a blind alley? It depends, of course, on how cost is
defined. One perceived cost might be doctrinal confusion down the line.
As David L. Shapiro has put it, "it is hard to overstate the value of
coherence and predictability in the law as a basis for avoiding disputes
and for facilitating settlements when disputes do arise."250 Even
constitutional rules, he argues, "affect a wide range of relationships,
especially those involving the interaction between the public and private
spheres." 2 5 1
When a state court seeking to engage in independent analysis adapts
for state constitutional purposes what appears to be a suitable federal
framework, conflicts may arise. The New Hampshire exclusionary rule
cases demonstrate this possibility: the later case, Lopez, follows from a
federal conception of the rule that the earlier case, Canelo, discounted
based upon a different understanding of the values that the exclusionary
rule promotes under the state constitution. It is not clear that these
inconsistent results will ever become so problematic-that is, costly-
that the New Hampshire Supreme Court will have to devote attention to
untangling the doctrinal strands. And it is not clear that even several
such instances in a particular area of individual rights jurisprudence
would be enough to cause the court to consider undertaking the hard
work of articulating a coherent doctrinal framework under the state
constitution, one that optimally effectuates the right at issue and is
internally consistent. Conflicting results down the line and the
accompanying costs are, as I note, merely a possibility, while the
246. FRIED, supra note 119, at 5.
247. See id. at 7-8.
248. Id. at 8-9.
249. Id. at 9.
250. David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An




constraints on the time the court has available to devote to any particular
case today are a relative certainty.
Then there is the question of how a state court might develop its
own doctrinal frameworks. As Gardner has demonstrated, a doctrinal
approach is unlikely to emerge from state constitutional text or history, at
least in respect to those rights protections common to the state and
federal constitutions.252 More likely a judge--or a law clerk-will be
impressed by a particular way of understanding an individual right or
liberty as presented by an advocate before the court, or by a legal
commentator-in other words, by those whom Clayton Gillette refers to
as "legal entrepreneurs," those lawyers who have an incentive to engage
in doctrinal innovation.253
If state constitutional legal entrepreneurs are to have any chance of
success, a state court must be willing to use its discretion to seriously
consider a proposed doctrinal innovation.254 Assuming, as we should,
that state court judges will honor their obligation to say what the state
constitution means, we would have to hope they will be open to
alternative ways of configuring the standards governing how the
judiciary should enforce a constitutional commitment to a particular
individual right. The legal entrepreneur's proposal would have to
provide some advantage over the relevant federal model in order for the
court to believe it would be worth the investment. Such advantages
could be understood in a variety of ways. For instance, the proposed test
could reflect a more nuanced understanding of the value of the right at
issue under the state constitution, or perhaps the proposed test could be
used to avoid some of the difficulties the courts have encountered in
applying the federal test.
For legal entrepreneurs to succeed in this effort, they must persuade
the court that, whatever the relative advantages of the proposed doctrinal
standards, those advantages would outweigh the costs of adoption, with
the costs measured in terms of the time the court would have to allocate
to explicating and applying its new state constitutional test going
forward, in future cases. Because the state supreme court is the final
arbiter of the meaning of the state constitution, it could consider adopting
the proposed constitutional standard knowing that its rule will have to be
252. See GARDNER, supra note 3, at 6-7.
253. See Gillette, supra note 90, at 823 (discussing "legal entrepreneurs" and the
incentives to overcome precedent).
254. See id. at 825 (noting that lock-in effects in respect to common law rules "are
highly dependent on judicial incentives to overcome or extend precedent").
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followed by the lower courts.255 At the same time, however, that
certainty would not obviate the cost to the attorneys in the state who will
be litigating that individual rights issue-the cost associated with
developing arguments under the new test. Recall that, by the time the
Vermont Supreme Court decided the Murcury case, the new equality test
the court announced in Baker under the Common Benefits Clause had
begun to resemble in its operation a species of federal equal protection
doctrine.256
Let's return to the hypothetical, phenomenological account of how
the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided the good-faith exception
issue in State v. Canelo.257 In that account, our law clerk ultimately
grounded the court's decision in the New Hampshire cases stressing the
importance of individual privacy and the decisions of other state courts
that applied differently the federal doctrinal framework used to analyze
exclusionary rule problems. Suppose, instead, that counsel for the
defendant in Canelo had sought to engage in some entrepreneurial
lawyering, arguing that the court should adopt a different exclusionary
rule framework. Rather than rely upon the federal doctrine, counsel
proposes that separation of powers principles should form the basis of a
test that would treat violations of the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures as instances in which illegal government action
should be struck down as a matter of judicial review. This approach
finds support in a law review article discussing alternatives to the U.S.
Supreme Court's exclusionary rule analysis,25 8 as well as in the long-
standing view of separation of powers under the New Hampshire
Constitution, which emphasizes the distinct roles and obligations of each
department of the government.2 59
On this view, a finding that government agents acted illegally, even
if they did so in "good faith," would result in exclusion of the evidence
seized. As the authors of the article, Thomas S. Schrock and Robert C.
Welsh, reasoned, "when search and seizure conduct is successfully
challenged as unreasonable," the defendant has a right "to exclusion of
255. See id. at 824 (noting that the "presence of the central authority reduces
uncertainty.., about the willingness of others in the network to adopt the superior
standard").
256. See supra notes 169-93 and accompanying text (discussing Vermont Supreme
Court's application of Baker test in Murcury case).
257. See supra notes 231-40 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenology
of state constitutional decisonmaking).
258. Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1975).
259. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 688 A.2d 1006, 1010 (N.H. 1997) (noting that
separation of powers protects "the sovereignty and freedom of those governed by
preventing the tyranny of any one branch of the government being supreme").
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the disputed evidence, because exclusion is the only concrete expression
which adverse judicial review of unreasonable searches and seizures can
take." 2 60 Such an approach would essentially eliminate the fact-sensitive
inquiry into the relative importance of deterring police misconduct and
the gravity of the privacy injury to the search victim. At the same time,
the state could be afforded an opportunity to show a compelling reason
why evidence in a particular case should not be excluded,
notwithstanding the constitutional violation.26 1
After reading defense counsel's brief, and the law review article
upon which counsel based the argument, our law clerk is convinced that
this approach best reflects the values embraced by the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. But she
understands her judge. She knows that, if she were to draft an opinion
that adopted this alternative analytical path--one that envisions the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as functioning in a
way fundamentally different from the way in which the U.S. Supreme
Court sees the Fourth Amendment functioning-her judge will need
convincing. And even if she were successful in that effort, her judge
would then have to try and convince his or her colleagues.
There is precedent for this happening, at least in the context of the
common law. In Aranson v. Schroeder,262 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court addressed a question transferred without ruling from the trial court:
does New Hampshire recognize a cause of action for malicious defense?
The plaintiffs below argued that allowing a claim for malicious
prosecution-which condemns plaintiffs for relying upon false
evidence-but not for similar action by the defense was "one-sided and
unfair. Both forms of misconduct should be treated the same; both
should be condemned, and made the subject of damages." 2 63
The court accepted this argument, reasoning that, absent a claim for
malicious defense, the only remedy the plaintiffs had was a demand for
260. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 258, at 309.
261. It's worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance upon deterrence as an
animating rationale for the exclusionary rule was not inevitable. The Court made a
choice in the 1970s not to continue to consider the rule a necessary corollary to the
Fourth Amendment, though other approaches to enforcing the Fourth Amendment had
presented themselves-like the separation of powers. Importantly, the concerns the high
court had in mind when it established the current exclusionary rule path might be
irrelevant to the work of the state court interpreting the state constitution. See Lawrence
G. Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules
of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 974-75 (1985) (discussing strategic concerns
that may influence U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of constitutional individual rights
provisions).
262. Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023 (N.H. 1995).
263. Id. at 1026.
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sanctions against the defendants for their alleged use of false evidence.264
That claim, however, would entail a more limited recovery. A plaintiff,
the court stated, is no less "aggrieved when the groundless claim put
forth in the courts is done defensively rather than affirmatively."2 65
Importantly, in arguing that the court should create a cause of action for
malicious defense, the plaintiffs cited to a law review article proposing
such a tort.266 The court, in turn, expressly relied upon that article and
arguments derived from it in explaining the new cause of action and
articulating a doctrinal standard for its implementation.2 67
I point to this example not to celebrate the utility of academic
contributions to litigation disputes, but to show that innovation may in
some circumstances be possible. The court's opinion in Aranson seems
to suggest that basic fairness concerns won the day-the court was
moved to create a remedy for those individuals who might be genuinely
aggrieved by a defendant's use of false evidence in civil litigation. One
hopes that such concerns would convince the court to similarly innovate
in an individual rights case of constitutional dimension. But then there is
the classic distinction between judicial decisionmaking in respect to the
constitution and a state's common law. In constitutional matters, the
court will be enacting rules that govern the actions of government until
such time as the political will exists to support a constitutional
amendment, while the state legislature, if it disapproved of the tort of
malicious defense, could statutorily abolish or modify that common law
cause of action.
Accordingly, even if the New Hampshire Supreme Court justice
assigned Canelo were convinced by our hypothetical law clerk to adopt
the new exclusionary rule framework suggested by defense counsel, he
or she would not only have to convince at least two colleagues that the
framework reflected a superior understanding of the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and provided a
manageable way to address such issues in future cases, but also that
those benefits outweighed the costs of change. At a minimum, those
costs include the investment of time that the supreme court, the lower
courts, and attorneys would have to make in understanding and applying
the new doctrinal approach. And this is setting aside concerns that might
be raised about how such a move might be perceived-in some states,
264. See id. at 1027.
265. Id.
266. See Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A
Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891
(1984).
267. See Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1028-29 (outlining elements of doctrinal standard for
tort of malicious defense).
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legislatures have sought to cabin the judiciary's discretion to innovate
under the state constitution.2 68 Legal entrepreneurs may have solid
proposals to make, but the potential costs of exploring these proposals
point toward continued reliance upon federal doctrinal constructs.
IV. THE ENDURING VALUE OF INDEPENDENT STATE
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Accepting the limitations imposed by path dependence and the
constraints of time on the ability of state courts to innovate doctrinally,
still there is something to be said for what state courts can contribute to
constitutional individual rights jurisprudence. To illustrate, let's return
to Commonwealth v. Ortiz-the case involving the application, under the
Massachusetts Constitution, of the federal doctrine governing intentional
misstatements in a warrant application. Recall that the defendant's
attorney had asked for an amicus brief discussing.why, under the state
constitution, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
should be construed more expansively than under the Fourth
Amendment, to invalidate a search based upon a warrant application that
omitted certain information about the identification procedures used by
the police.269
The law in this area derives from Franks v. Delaware,27 0 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that intentional misstatements in a
warrant application do not undermine a search, so long as the application
271
supported probable cause even absent the misstatements. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted this framework as
controlling under the state constitution, though it suggested in one case
that an affiant's perjurious statements in a warrant application could
invalidate the search regardless whether the application otherwise
supported probable cause.272
Here, then, we have a situation in which path dependence is strong:
the state supreme court has already imported the basic federal test into
state law, and the state courts have been dutifully applying that test for
268. In Florida, for example, the state constitution has been amended to provide that
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures "shall be construed in
conformity with the 4 Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. For discussion of the
various ways in which the electorate or the legislature can seek to overturn state
constitutional individual rights rulings, see WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 128-29.
269. See supra notes 6-29 and accompanying text (discussing Ortiz case and federal
doctrinal structure).
270. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
271. See id. at 171-72.
272. See Commonwealth v. Nine Hundred and Ninety-Two Dollars, 422 N.E.2d 767,
771 (Mass. 1981).
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many years. It could be argued that other analyses are available-say,
one that abandons the harmless-error basis approach of the federal test in
favor of one that places more weight on the intrinsic value of the
warrant-issuing process. But it is unlikely such an argument would be
sufficient to overcome the constraints on the state court's ability to make
the investment in time it would take to develop that alternative approach,
especially against the years of precedent applying the federal construct
under the state constitution.
Further, it should be noted that Ortiz is a case, like so many, in
which a resort to Romantic subnationalism would be unavailing. There
is not likely a unique historical event or state tradition that would justify
a departure from federal precedent. As Gardner has noted,273 the text of
the Massachusetts provision is textually distinct from the Fourth
Amendment. Where the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be
"supported by Oath or affirmation,"274 Article 14 of the state constitution
requires that warrants must have a "cause or foundation" that is
"previously supported by oath or affirmation," and that no warrant
should issue except when in accordance "with the formalities prescribed
by the laws." 275 But the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not
used these differences to develop a different doctrinal approach, even in
respect to the warrant-issuing process.
With what does this leave the advocate in Ortiz? It leaves the
argument that the federal framework should be applied by the state court
in a way that balances differently the interests it was intended to
protect-on the one hand, the protection of individual privacy through
the requirement of an independently-determined cause to search; and, on
the other, the interest in ensuring the government's ability to search will
not be unduly restricted by requiring the police to reveal every scrap of
information available to them in a warrant application. Rather than seek
to articulate a different doctrinal approach under the state constitution,
this argument presses for a careful balancing of interests based upon the
facts presented under the existing test. It merely suggests, in other
words, that the state court need not weigh the interests that the federal
framework seeks to protect in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court
would.
A different perspective can mean a great deal where individual
rights enforcement is concerned. As Lawrence Sager and others have
argued, the U.S. Supreme Court has a tendency to underenforce federal
constitutional rights; Sager notes that the evidence of this phenomenon
273. See GARDNER, supra note 3, at 7.
274. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
275. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 14.
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includes "a disparity between the scope of a federal judicial construct
and that of plausible understandings of the constitutional concept from
which it derives, the presence in court opinions of frankly institutional
explanations for setting particular limits to a federal judicial construct,
and other anomalies."276 Accordingly, the fact that the Massachusetts
court is not, in Ortiz, creating rules of criminal procedure for the nation
is significant-it means, at a minimum, that the court can balance the
interests in individual privacy and law enforcement efficiency without
anxiety over the costs and consequences that balancing may create in
jurisdictions with varying resources.
Of course, a different balancing of interests ought to have some
basis. As in any constitutional case, the state court must be able to
justify its understanding of the way in which the applicable principles
should be applied in the matter at hand. In Ortiz, the balancing of
interests in ex post review of the warrant-issuing process can be informed
by those cases in which the state court has elaborated upon its conception
of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures-which is to
say, the protection of individual privacy from unwarranted government
intrusion. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held, for example,
in Commonwealth v. LaFrance,27 that search warrants may issue on less
than probable cause in the case of probationers.2 7 8 Under federal law, no
warrant is needed to conduct probation searches, but the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court could find no sound reason "to eliminate the
usual [constitutional] requirement imposed . .. that a search warrant be
obtained." 27 9 As the court put it, "[r]equiring an officer to articulate
reasons for the search is a deterrent to impulsive or arbitrary government
conduct," and that is what the search and seizure protection is "about." 280
Here, then, is a possible state constitutional argument in Ortiz:
under the state protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, an
affiant may not exclude from the warrant application any evidence that
could have influenced a magistrate's determination that probable cause
to search did or did not exist, such as an unsuccesful identification
procedure. Why? Because, as past state constitutional cases like
LaFrance show, the warrant itself is the most significant constitutional
safeguard of individual privacy: the need for a warrant deters "impulsive
276. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1218-19 (1978); see also WILLIAMS,
supra note 31, at 173-74.
277. Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 525 N.E.2d 379 (Mass. 1988).
278. See id. at 380.
279. Id. at 382.
280. Id. at 383 (quoting State v. Griffin, 388 N.W.2d 535, 545 (Wis. 1986)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
2011] 833
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
or arbitrary government conduct." 2 8 1 Nonetheless, in the interests of
practicality, affiants need not detail all that they know, and immaterial
omissions will not invalidate a search. Arguably, in the circumstances of
Ortiz-which involves witness identification of a shooter-an
unsuccesful identification should not be considered immaterial to the
probable cause determination. 282 The limits on "materiality" in this
context can await development in other cases; such a determination is not
beyond the judiciary's competence.2 83
This argument falls within the bounds of the doctrinal framework
for judicial review of the warrant-issuing process adopted by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from the federal courts. The
argument suggests that, to the extent the warrant-issuing process is
primarily concerned with the protection of privacy, the framework may
be applied in a way that credits the interest in privacy-and the
detrimental consequences to privacy of sanctioning harmless-error
review of probable cause determinations-differently than the federal
courts have. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court may have initially
developed this doctrinal test, but that does not necessarily mean that a
state court, any more than a differently-configured Supreme Court, must
value the interests the test seeks to protect in precisely the same way.
In pursuing this kind of state constitutional argument, state courts
may effectively challenge the U.S. Supreme Court's hold on individual
rights interpretation while managing the costs associated with an
independent inquiry into the optimal approach to effectuating a
constitutional command. Such challenges are in accord with various
normative visions of numerous state constitutional law scholars. James
Gardner, for example, has suggested that state judges should self-
consciously use state constitutionalism as a bulwark against federal
hegemony in the area of individual rights.284 Robert Schapiro has
similarly argued that different state constitutional interpretations of
common rights protections create an alternative jurisprudential vision
that serves to balance the interpretive efforts of the U.S. Supreme
Court.2 85 Paul Kahn has reasoned that state constitutionalism essentially
281. Id.
282. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ultimately dismissed the appeal in
Ortiz after being informed of the defendant's death while the court had the matter under
advisement. See Notice of Docket Entry, Commonwealth v. Ortiz, No. SJC-10466 (May
18, 2010).
283. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Madigan, 871 N.E.2d 478, 482 (Mass. 2007)
(discussing standard of materiality in context of evidence).
284. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 3, at 254-56 (reasoning that different levels of
government may act independently to secure individual rights).
285. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
IOWA L. REV. 243, 288-90 (2005).
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provides "a forum for discussion, disagreement, and opposition to
actions of the national government." 286 And I have argued that state
constitutionalism promotes dialogue between the state and federal
systems about the meaning of our constitutional commitments to
individual rights and liberties, and that a state court's contribution to this
dialogue need not depend upon the existence of a uniquely state-based
distinction between the texts.287
These normative threads support a decidely functional account of
what state courts can accomplish when they engage in independent state
constitutionalism-even when they operate under resource constraints.288
Were the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to have accepted the
hypothetical defendant's argument in Ortiz which I have outlined here,
and endorsed a different way of understanding how the Franks test could
be applied, it would have acted (consciously or not) to counter the
federal understanding of how the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures should work in the warrant context. Its decision
could then inform future constitutional arguments about this and like
issues-for constitutionalism, as Kahn has recognized, is "not a single
set of truths, but an ongoing debate about the meaning of the rule of law
in a democratic political order." 28 9
Indeed, every individual rights case in which a state court resolves
the balance of competing interests under a given doctrinal framework
differently than would a federal court makes that state court decision a
thread in the discussion about how we should be valuing such interests as
privacy, autonomy, free expression, equality, and due process in our
constitutional democracy. Each of these state constitutional individual
rights decisions, moreover, could serve as an entrance by a state court
into a dialogue with the U.S. Supreme Court about these issues and,
286. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HAR. L. REv. 1147, 1166 (1993).
287. See Friedman, supra note 121, at 95-97 (arguing that state constitutional
interpretation serves a checking and balancing function). Alternatively, Long sees
independent state constitutional interpretation as serving to "teas[e] out and bolster[] the
strands of culture that center on the state as a community," a process that aids in the
identification of states as distinct, autonomous communities. Long, supra note 1, at 102.
288. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 3, at 17 (maintaining that "[flunction". . .
provides the key to distinguishing state from national constitutions").
289. Kahn, supra note 286, at 1147-48. I should be clear here that I do not mean to
suggest that no state courts are approaching state constitutional individual rights
decisions in the way that Gardner, Kahn, and others have suggested; to the contrary,
many do, as decisions like Canelo and Baker demonstrate, and there are numerous other
examples. See, e.g., John Palfrey, The Public and the Private at the United States Border
with Cyberspace, 78 Miss. L.J. 241, 288 n.134 (2008) (citing cases in which state courts
have applied search and seizure framework to provide greater privacy protection than
federal courts have provided individuals under the Fourth Amendment).
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perhaps, influence a constitutional discourse that includes not just the
nine justices in Washington, but also their colleagues in other federal and
state courts, as well as scholars and jurists here and abroad.29 0 All of
this, potentially, from state courts simply considering anew the
possibilities contained in federal doctrinal constructs.
While the pull of path dependence is strong, that does not mean
state courts must be eclipsed by the U.S. Supreme Court when it comes
to the hard work of implementing constitutional individual rights
protections. State courts can make a valuable contribution toward
ensuring that established doctrinal frameworks serve to implement these
protections adequately and appropriately. The contributions of the state
courts to constitutional discourse may not in the end be what the
proponents of independent state constitutionalism had envisioned, but
they are no less needed, or welcome, for being somewhat more modest.
290. See Lawrence Friedman, Reconsidering Rational Basis: Equal Protection
Review Under the Wisconsin Constitution, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1071, 1084-85 (2007)
(discussing the importance of independent state constitutional decisions to constitutional
discourse about "how the balance between our need for order and our commitments to
individual rights ... ought to be struck").
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